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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1787, the Office of the President of
the United States has had to deal with many governmental problems,
burdening the President with extraordinary decisions.

As the coun

try has grown in population, in geography, and in world influence
the number of problems and decisions has escalated, placing immense
pressure upon the decision making process.'*’ Today, decisions made
by the President of the United States can affect the future of the
entire world.

Consequently, the advice and administrative assis

tance a president receives when he is making these decisions is
crucial. (^Furnishing the President with this advice and assistance
is one of the most influential elements in the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government, the Presidential Advisory S y s t e m ^
/

Consisting of several segments, the Presidential Advisory
System is a blend of the old and the relatively new.

The Presi

d e n t s Cabinet, composed of the heads of the executive departments,
has been a source of advice for presidents since its establishment
by George Washington, and until recently was the only formal

^•George Reedy, Press Secretary and Special Assistant to
President Lyndon Johnson, contends that "The presidential burden,
a . . , does not lie in the workload. It stems from the crushing
responsibility of political decision, with life and death literally
hanging in the balance for hundreds of millions of people." George
E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York:
The New
American Library, Inc., in association with The World Publishing
Company, 1970), p. 24.
1
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collective body the President could turn to for advice and assis
tance.

However, despite occupying a prestigious position in the

Executive Branch, its value as an advisory body has been over
rated.

Conflict of personalities within the Cabinet, the inde

pendence of the Cabinet members as heads of separate executive
departments, and often times the attitude of the President towards
the Cabinet have reduced its collective value.

The value of the

Cabinet as an advisory source has been realized more through the
work of individual members acting as counselors to the President.
Many times a single Cabinet member has emerged as the President’s
o
favori te advis e r .
A second segment of the Presidential Advisory System con
sists of those individuals or groups who contribute advice and
assistance to the President but are not a part of the Executive
'Branch, or, in some instances, not a part of the Federal Govern
ment.

Some of these outsiders have found their way into the

circle of the President’s closest advisers, sometimes termed the
’’Inner Circle.”

A president may receive advice

. . . from members of the Congress; from independent wise
men, elder statesmen, academic lights; from presidentially
named high level commissions or special agents; or merely

2
Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury under George
Washington, was a favorite Presidential adviser, as was Albert
Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury under Thomas Jefferson. During
the Civil War, Edwin Stanton, Lincoln’s Secretary of War, was a
close adviser, and more recently, during the Vietnam War, Lyndon
Johnson’s closest advisers were Secretary of State Dean Rusk and
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

3
from conversations with friends, visitors, private interest
. leaders, and others.3
Outsiders have been advisers to the President since the
early days of the government.

A constant correspondent of Jeffer

son was Pierre Samuel DuPont de Nemours, one of the founders of
the DuPont Company.

Frank Stearns, a prominent Boston business

man, was a companion and confidant of Calvin Coolidge; and prob
ably one of the most influential outsiders in the history of the
Presidency was Woodrow Wilson’s adviser, Colonel Edward M, House.
Precipitated by the expansion of the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government that took place during his first adminis
tration, and the inability of the existing structure to supply the
advice and assistance he needed, Franklin Roosevelt established
the newest segment of the Presidential Advisory System in 1939,
the Executive Office of the President.

Structurally closest to

the”President, the Executive Office represents the first institu
tionalized organization created expressly for the purpose of
advising and assisting the President of the United States, and has
become the core of the Presidential Advisory System.
Before 1939, there was no legal provision for a staff of
Presidential assistants other than the President’s small personal
administrative staff.

Advisers and assistants worked unofficially

as aides to the President, holding positions in various executive
agencies, but working for the President.

With the rapid expansion

3Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making In The White House,
The Olive Branch or The Arrows (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1963), p. 72.

4
of the Executive Branch there was a realization of the need for
more full time assistance.

Thus, in 1935 Roosevelt set in motion

the events that led to the establishment of the Executive Office
of the President and the institutionalization of the Presidential
Advisory System.

Chart 1-1
The Presidential Advisory System of Today
The President

Outside Advisers
i

The Cabinet
1,
2,
3,
. 4.
5.
6.
7.
8•
9,
10.
11.
12.

Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Agriculture
Postmaster General
Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare
Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development
Secretary of Transpor
tation

The Executive Office
1.
2.
3.
4.
5*
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

The White House Office
Office of Management and
Budget
Domestic Council
National Security Council
Energy Policy Office
Office of Economic Oppor
tunity
Council on Economic Policy
Federal Property Council
Council of Economic
Advisers
Office of the Special
Representative for Trade
Negotiations
Council on International
Economic Policy
Council on Environmental
Quality
Special Action Office for
Drug Abuse Prevention
Office of Telecommunica
tions Policy

Roosevelt originally included the White House Office, the
Bureau of the Budget, and three agencies which are no longer

functioning, in the Executive Office of the President.

4

Later, he

established the office of Special Counsel to the President as part
of the Executive Office.

When the Council of Economic Advisers

and the National Security Countil were established as part of the
Executive Office after his death, Roosevelt's administrative
innovations acted as models.

These agencies, along with the other

agencies that have been added to the Executive Office since its
establishment, presently serve the President by performing
advisory, supervisory, and coordinating f u n c t i o n s " T h e y advise
the President, they supervise other units in the Executive Branch,
and they try to coordinate similar work being done by a number of
organizations."^
The continuous expansion of its size and influence since
1939 has subjected the Executive Office of the President, and more
particularly the White House Office, to a great deal of criticism
in the last few years.

Much of this criticism has been triggered

by the ^Watergate scandal."

For example, historian Daniel J.

Boorstin believes that the Executive Office of the President has
gotten too large to control.^ "The Executive Office of the Presi
dent has expanded beyond all bounds and has tended to supersede

4The three agencies which are no longer functioning in the
Executive Office are The National Resources Planning Board, The
Liaison Office for Personnel Management, and The Office of Govern
ment Reports.
5

James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch, An
Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 24.
6Ibid.

6
7
the executive branch of the government .**

He believes that, in

the Watergate Affair, (this expansion of the Executive Office made
it possible for people in the White House to use the Presidents
authority without his knowing it, and it also made it possible for
him to say he did not know what was going on.'j Dr * Boorstin
suggests that the Executive Office ought to be closely scutinized,
0
implying that its size ought to be reduced.
Possibly, something
of this nature may be attempted in the future by Congress or by
the President himself.

But, any attempt at the reduction of the

size and power of the Executive Office must take into consideration
the need for the President to carry out his administrative duties.
Otherwise, the President will encounter the same problem of inade
quate administrative assistance encountered by Roosevelt before
the Executive Office was established.
Roosevelts establishment of the Executive Office of the
President is one of the most significant events in the history of
the Presidency.

Because of his great influence on the institution

alization of the Presidential Advisory System, it is the purpose of
this paper to examine Rooseveltfs advisory system and the contri
butions he made to its structure.

The paper will focus on the

Executive Office, why it was needed, and the struggle involved in
its establishment.

Also, individual chapters will be devoted to

those present day Executive Office agencies whose existence in the

7 "Historian Decries Watergate as *Cult of Personality1,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXXI, No. 27 (1973), 1799.
8Ibid.

Executive Office of the President was influenced by Roosevelt.
Agencies discussed will be the White House Office and the Bureau
of the Budget, original occupants of the Executive Office, the
Council of Economic Advisers and the National Security Council,
agencies which also owe their existence in part to Roosevelt.
Each chapter will briefly review the evolution of the agency and
Rooseveltfs influence on that evolution.

CHAPTER II

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Until the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, when the
Presidents of the United States needed administrative help and
advice ^hey relied on a loosely structured extra-legal advisory
system.^ It consisted of the Presidents Cabinet, an effective
J
;
source of advice when the members were consulted individually but
a relatively ineffective source when consulted as a collective
body, and an informal group of personal advisers that became known
as the ffInner Circle.”

Both had their beginnings during George

WashingtonS administration and served succeeding Presidents until
the 1930S

when Roosevelt realized that the President needed some

thing more stable and reliable.
When the Founding Fathers were deliberating over the com
position of the Chief Executive at the Constitutional Convention,
the idea of establishing an advisory council was discussed at great
length^

Edmund Randolph, in the Virginia Resolutions, called for

a council of revision made up of the Executive and members of the
National Judiciary with authority to exercise the veto power.

1

Gouverneur Morris proposed a council of state composed of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Secretary of Domestic Affairs,

1James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention, ed.
E. H. Scott (Chicago: Albert, Scott and Co., 1893), p. 62.
8

the Secretary of the Marine, and a Secretary of State to act as
Secretary to the Council and Public Secretary to the President.

2

George Mason suggested the following:
• . c a Privy Council, of six members, t.n the President,
be established; to be chosen for six years by the Senate,
two out of the Middle, and two out of the Southern
quarters of the Union; and to go out in rotation, two
every second year; . . .3
Despite all of the suggestions made, when a complete draft
of the Constitution was drawn up in the Committee on Style the
council idea was dropped.

Some of the Founding Fathers felt that

a council might impede the President.

"Give him an able Council

and it will thwart him; a weak one and he will shelter himself
4
under their sanction."
The final draft of the Constitution only
mentioned that the President ". . . may require the opinion, in
writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive depart
ments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
5
offices, . . . "
It was, therefore, left for a Presidential
advisory structure to evolve.
Because George Washington was the first President of the
United States, it was natural that his actions in office would
set precedents followed by succeeding Presidents.

When he became

2Ibid., pp. 560-561o
3Ibid., p. 679.
^James Madison, The Writings of James Madison, IV, ed.
Gaillard Hunt (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1903), p. 234.
3U.S., Constitution, Art. 2, sec. 2.

10
President, attempts were made by him to obtain advice from both
the Supreme Court and the Senate, but these attempts failed.
Efforts at obtaining advice from the Supreme Court were rebuffed,
with the Court claiming that ’’separation of powers” precluded it
from supplying the Executive Branch with advice.

Separation of

powers also played a part in Washington’s efforts to secure the
opinion of the Senate on a pressing matter.

The Senate acted

annoyed and delayed giving Washington an answer, indicating their
fL

displeasure at being consulted by the President.
Washington did have some limited success with the heads of
the executive departments.

By having conferences with them to dis

cuss important matters, he expanded the Constitutional stipulation
of asking for the opinions of the executive heads in writing.
During 1792 and 1793, these conferences became more frequent, and
in the latter years of his Presidency it was a routine matter to
consult with his executive heads, often times having them vote in
an attempt to arrive at a collective decision.

7

Thus, in an

effort to obtain additional opinions on important matters, Wash
ington established an extra-constitutional governmental body, the
President1s Cabinet.
Washington’s efforts at forming the Cabinet and his
attempts at establishing it as the President’s advisory council

^Marcus Cunliffe, American Presidents and the Presidency
(New York: American Heritage Press, 1972), pp. 46-50.
7Ibid.

11
were never completely successful.

The Cabinet has never func

tioned adequately as a collective advisory body.

Individual

Cabinet members have become close advisers to the President, but
the Cabinet’s role as an advisory council has been overrated.
Even within Washington’s Cabinet, there was constant turmoil
caused by personality conflicts and differences of philosophy.
These conflicts impeded chances for the Cabinet to act collectively.
Succeeding Presidents did not have any more success than
Washington in developing the full advisory potential of the
Cabinet.
him.

John Adams’ Cabinet was a center for conspiracy against

Jefferson ignored his Cabinet when he was considering the

Louisiana Purchase and Lincoln did the same when he was deliber
ating over the Emancipation Proclamation.

Jackson appointed four

different Cabinet-s during his Presidency and found he could not
work satisfactorily with any of them.

Woodrow Wilson very seldom

met with his Cabinet during the First World War and Calvin
Coolidge’s Cabinet meetings usually lasted only fifteen minutes.

9

The capacity of the President’s Cabinet to function as an
advisory body is hampered by the way it is constituted.

Each

member is the head of an important individual department in the
Executive Branch of the Government, being named to the Cabinet to

O
For an indication of the problems faced by Washington
when dealing with his Cabinet see Chapter 31 in James Thomas Flexner?s George Washington And The New Nation, 1783-1793 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1969).
^Louis W. Koenig, The Invisible Presidency (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p . 17.

12
act as individuals while operating that department.

They have

collective responsibility only when they are called together by
the P r e s i d e n t . ^

11
policies.”

’’Cabinet members tend to pursue their own

As a result, Cabinet members are often more com

petitive in their dealings with each other and their relationships
with the President .

’’They are champions of special and competing

private interests, of groups functionally specialized.

They are

competitors with respect to appropriations, authority, and pres
tige.”12
The ability of the Cabinet to act as an advisory body is
further impeded by the factors involved when a President chooses
his Cabinet members .
in that Cabinet.

He is not always free to pick whom he wants

Party, personal loyalty, geography, socio

economic factors, and specialized talents all figure in the
c h o o s i n g of a Cabinet member; and they can influence the future
interaction of the President and his Cabinet.

Richard F. Fenno,

Jr., author of The President’s Cabinet, calls these factors ’’the
components of availability” and ’’the components of balance.

J. Wann, The President as Chief Administrator, A Study
of Franklin D . Roosevelt (Vvhshington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press,
1968), p. 46.
11 Lester G. Seligman, ’’Presidential Leadership: The Inner
Circle and Institutionalization,” The Journal of Politics, XVIII
(August 1956), 412.
■®-2paui H. Appleby, ’’Organizing Around the Head of a Large
Federal Department,” Public Administration Review, VI (Summer 1946),
207.
^■^Richard F. Fenno, The President *s Cabinet (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 68-80, passim.

13
To avoid partisan conflicts, the entire Cabinet is, with
few exceptions, from the same political party as the President;
and Cabinet positions have often been political rewards for ser
vice to the party.

For years it was a tradition that the chair

man of the party’s national committee during the President’s
successful campaign be named Postmaster General in the new
Cabinet, a post in which a person could easily fulfill Cabinet
duties and at the same time handle the responsibilities of chair
man of the national committee,,^
Jj.

Closely related to party loyalty as a factor involved in
choosing a Cabinet member is personal loyalty, the criteria for
which is set by each President,

Woodrow Wilson’s conception of

personal loyalty was the readiness a person displayed to follow
his lead without question.

A criteria for an appointment to

Franklin Roosevelt’s Cabinet was preconvention support.

15

Geography also plays an important part in the selection of
Cabinet members.

Because a preponderance of the activities of the

Department of Interior is concerned with the Western states, the
Secretary of the Interior frequently comes from the West, and a
farm state usually provides the Cabinet with the Secretary of
Agriculture.

In an effort to give representation to each geo

graphical section of the country, the President generally makes an
effort to balance his Cabinet with appointees from all parts of the
nation.

Usually, important political states like New York, Ohio ,

14Ibid., pp. 68-70.
•^Ibid., p. 71.

14
Illinois, and California are represented, as is the P r e s idents
home state."^
Allied with the geographical factors involved in naming
Cabinet members are the socio-economic factors.

The Secretary of

Agriculture chosen from a farm state not only represents a geo
graphical region, but also represents a socio-economic group, the
farmer.

The same is true of the Secretary of Labor, who is nor

mally from an industrial state and represents labor.

The Secretary

of Commerce, who gives the businessman a representative, often
17
comes from a commercially oriented state.
Administrative ability, political experience, and special
knowledge are also factors considered when Cabinet members are
selected.

18

However, as it is with all the factors involved in

chopsing Cabinet members, these qualities do not mean that the
individual Cabinet member will function with the Cabinet as a
whole, or be able to communicate well with the President who
appointed him.
Presidents, therefore, came to rely on individual Cabinet
members rather than the Cabinet as a whole.

These individual mem

bers became part of an informal group of personal advisers that
also had its beginning in the Washington Presidency.

Washington

included Congressman James Madison, Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, and in

16Ibid., pp. 71-79.

^^Ibid

.

18Ibid«, pp. 75, 80.

15
the early years Chief Justice John Jay in his informal circle of
advisers.
Following Washington’s lead, succeeding Presidents,
partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Cabinet as a
group, sought advice on matters important and confidential from
those to whom they felt closest.

This group of the Presidents

closest advisers became known as the "Inner Circle,11 with some of
the closer knit circles being immortalized by the press.

Jackson’s

and lyier’s were referred to as the ’’Kitchen Cabinet,” Cleveland’s
was the ’’Fishing Cabinet,” and Teddy Roosevelt’s circle of advisers
was known as the "Tennis Cabinet.”

This group’s composition

varied, depending upon who enjoyed the chief executive’s confi
dence.

The advisers came from the Cabinet, the President’s per

sonal staff, officials of the various executive agencies, members
of Congress, party leaders, personal friends, and leaders of major
interest groups such as labor and agriculture.
When Franklin Roosevelt became President in 1933, it was
the loose structure of the Cabinet and his circle of personal
advisers that he had to rely on for administrative assistance and
advice in solving the problems of the Depression.

However, in

addition to the factors faced by previous Presidents when dealing
with the Cabinet, Roosevelt had certain personal traits which
hindered his working relationship with the Cabinet as a collective
body.

Roosevelt preferred dealing with people individually on a

face to face basis, and he was reluctant to delegate authority.

19

Koenig, pp. 39-43.

16
Most of the important matters were discussed with the Cabinet mem
ber outside of the Cabinet meeting in their separate capacities as
heads of their departments, not as the collective Cabinet0

In the

beginning he held regular Friday meetings of the Cabinet and
encouraged very searching inquiries and lengthy discussions with
all the Cabinet members participating.

After a while, the pro

cedure lapsed into a direct communication between a particular
cabinet officer and the President concerning the Cabinet member's
special field.

20

Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the

Interior, described the relationship that existed between the
President and his Cabinet .
The cold fact is that on important matters we are
seldom called upon for advice. We never discuss
exhaustively any policy of government or question of
political strategy. The President makes all of his own
decisions and, so far at least as the Cabinet is con
cerned, without taking counsel with a group of advisers.
On particular questions he will call into his office
persons directly interested, but it is fair to say that
the Cabinet is not a general council upon whose advice
the President relies or the opinions of which, on
important matters, he calls for.21
Also, it was not uncommon for Roosevelt to bypass Cabinet
heads on a particular issues.

Sometimes he would use unofficial

advisers to carry out tasks that were traditionally performed by
Cabinet members.
informally as a

Harry Hopkins, for example, served Roosevelt
. . buffer, communication line, sounding board,

2^Wann, p p . 47-48.
21

Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. I ekes,
Vol. I: The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1953), p. 308.

17
22
coordinator, listening post, and mouthpiece abroad.”

In domestic

affairs Ickes and Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, both com
plained of not being consulted on various issues.

In the area of

foreign affairs Roosevelt believed it was necessary to be his own
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.
Roosevelt generally shied away from inter-departmental
mechanisms such as standing committees and secretaries.

With the

aversion he had towards inter-departmental mechanisms and his dis
inclination to work with the Cabinet, it was ironic that Roosevelt
was the President who created the first Cabinet secretariat, the
National Emergency Council.

24

In an effort to help coordinate the many agencies estab
lished to fight the depression, he formed, by executive order, the
Executive Council in July of 1933 ". . . t o provide for the orderly
presentation of business and to coordinate inter-agency problems of
organization and work of the new governmental agencies,

25
. . .”

Nothing more than the Cabinet expanded to include the heads of the
newly formed economic emergency organizations, the Executive Coun
cil met with the President every Tuesday.
Brownlow that "these meetings,

Roosevelt told Louis

. . • , were exceedingly useful in

22Fenno, p . 46.
23Ibid., pp. 45-46.
2^Richard E. Neustadt, "Approaches to Staffing The Presi
dency," The American Political Science Review, LVII (December 1963),
856.
25

Samuel I . Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses
Franklin D . Roosevelt, II (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 281.

18
keeping him informed of what was going on, especially in the
,,26
emergency agencies."
The Executive Council proved to be too large and cumber
some.

As a result, on November 17, 1933, by executive order,

Roosevelt established the National Emergency Council (NEC).
The purpose of the National Emergency Council was to be a working
O O

secretariat for the Executive Council.

It was to coordinate the

New Deal agencies and ". . . t o act in a capacity advisory to the
President.

. •

O Q

The NEC was to handle the functions pertaining

to the emergency activities instituted to help combat the depres
sion, and the Executive Council was to handle those matters not
connected with the emergency program.
The National Emergency Council and the Executive Council
met with the President on alternate weeks at first, and then began
having joint meetings with him.

Distinction between the two bodies

became increasingly difficult, so in October, 1934, Roosevelt

2^Louis Brownlow, A Passion For Anonymity (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 319.
2^The National Emergency Council was composed of the Sec
retary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
Labor, the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of Agri
cultural Adj'ustment, the Administrator of Federal Emergency Relief,
the Administrator for Industrial Recovery, the Chairman of the Home
Owners Loan Corporation, the Governor of the Farm Credit Adminis
tration, and a representative of the Consumers1 Council. The
Attorney General, the Director of the Budget, and the Chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission were added a month later.
28Brownlow, p. 320.
2^Rosenman, Roosevelt's Public Papers, II, p. 488.

19
consolidated the two under the name of the National Emergency
-1 30
Council.
As a coordinating body the National Emergency Council
proved to

be a disappointment.

For one thing, the Council was

too large to be effective. Quoting RoOsevelt:
. . . like a New England Town meeting, it was too big
to do much actual work. It had to be split up into
committees until in the end I couldn't take it any more
because I found myself making stump speeches to the
council instead of listening to its members.3
Secondly, Roosevelt's desire to be the final decision maker
crippled the coordinating capacity of the Council.

He really

never gave it authority to act for him, and he never fully
supported the Executive Director.

The Executive Director was

never given any real power, and final decisions had to be made by
Roosevelt himself, thereby, causing confusion within the Council.
Instead of using the Council as an effective integrating device in
itself, he simply used it as a means to help him coordinate.

32

He

used the Council like he used the Cabinet, as a sounding board,
getting ideas from members and using them to perfect his own ideas.
"He delegated authority and controlled his subordinates in such a
way that the power to make final . . .
remained in his own tight grip."

^^Brownlow, p. 321.
3lIbid.
32Wann, p . 71.
33Ibid.

33

decisions almost always

Although the National Emergency

20
Council was a disappointment as a coordinative body, it did offex
the President a source of advice and information concerning the
progress of the emergency relief programs.
In the thirties, the nature of the times and the decisions
that had to be made forced Franklin Roosevelt to call upon what
James MacGregor Burns terms a "stable of advisers."

34

His infor

mal group of advisers consisted of people from all facets of
national government plus some outside of the government.

It

became a large and ever changing group with people constantly
i
moving into and out of i t .
From the Cabinet, James Farley was one of Roosevelt1s
chief advisers on political matters until the two had a falling
out when Roosevelt ran for a third term in 1940.

Also enjoying a

closer relationship with Roosevelt than did most of the other
Cabinet members were Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the
Treasury, and Henry Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture and later
Vice President of the United States•
Roosevelt’s circle of advisers also included Congressional
leaders:

Senator Key Pittman of Nevada became a member of Roose

v e l t ’s pre-1932 election policy advisers, and James F. Byrnes,
Senator from South Carolina served Roosevelt in several capacities
until Roosevelt’s death.

In the House of Representatives, a fre

quent conferee of Roosevelt’s was Sam Rayburn, Congressman from
Texas who became Speaker of the House in 1940.

35

^ J a m e s MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 154.
35see Booth Mooney’s Roosevelt and Rayburn, A Political
Partnership (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Go., 1971).

21
Outside of government, Roosevelt consulted with old
politicos like Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson’s former assistant,
and labor leaders like William Green of the American Federation
of Labor

Edward J. Flynn, political boss of the Bronx in New

York, was a close political adviser while Roosevelt was Governor
of New York and while he was President0

When James Farley

resigned as Chairman of the National Democratic Party, he was
succeeded by Flynn,
A perennial adviser to presidents from Woodrow Wilson to
Dwight Eisenhower was financier Bernard M, Baruch,

Although he

opposed Roosevelt’s nomination in 1932, he frequently contributed
advice and assistance after Roosevelt became President,

Baruch’s

• • . proteges manned many of the subsequent key New
Deal posts; Hugh Johnson came in as administrator of NRA,
George N. Peek as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and
Herbert Swope, as an all-around assistant.
Felix Frankfurter, Harvard law professor and a Roosevelt
Supreme Court appointee, was a long time good friend and constant
adviser of Roosevelt’s even after Frankfurter became A Supreme
Court Justice.
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As was the case with Bernard Baruch, Frank

furter’s proteges became prominent members of Roosevelt’s admin
istration.

^ B u r n s , p . 154 .
^Koenig, p, 39,
88The extent of their friendship can be seen in Roosevelt
and Frankfurter, Their Correspondence 1928-1945, annotated by Max
Freedman. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967.
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Also included in Roosevelt’s circle of advisers were aides
who worked unofficially for the President.

Holding positions in

various executive agencies, these unofficial aides served as
policy advisers and administrative assistants,

This group was

extra-legal in nature and included some of Roosevelt’s closest
adviserso

Roosevelt used these aides informally to handle a lot

of.behind-the-scenes tasks.

In filling a gap that existed on the
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White House staff, their help was informal and somewhat irregular.
During most o f his first two terms in office, it was the
loose advisory structure consisting of the Cabinet and the infor
mal group of advisers, supplemented by the National Emergency
Council and his personal staff, that Roosevelt primarily depended
upon for advice and assistance.

The consolidating and institution

alizing of this loose structure was one of Roosevelt’s Objectives
when he began efforts towards the end of his first term to reorgan
ize the Executive.

The product of his efforts was the Executive

40
Office of the President.
One of Roosevelt’s goals when he took office in 1933 was
the improvement of governmental administration by reorganization of
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.

However, his efforts

to do this were curtailed for much of the first term because p r e 
occupation with efforts to counteract the effects of the depression
precluded any moves toward reorganization.

39

Wann, p. 40.

40Ibid.

By 1935, the growth of
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the Executive Branch and the confusion caused by the creation of
numerous depression fighting government agencies made it impera
tive that a major reorganization effort be launched0

His attempts

at reorganizing and coordinating, as exemplified in the establish
ment of the Executive Council and the National Emergency Council,
were minimally successful.
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Roosevelt recognized that:
an otherwise professional performance during his
first term in the Presidency was being severely hampered
by the sheer multiplicity and complexity of his duties
and by the want of effective assistance in their dis
charge ,42
In the summer of 1935, Roosevelt began discussing the
problem of improved management in the Executive Branch with the
members of the Advisory Committee to the National Resources
SBoaxd.
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During the course of one of these discussions, Roosevelt

asked Professor Charles E. Merriam, one of the Committee’s members,
to submit a memorandum on the subject.

Merriam, with the collab

oration of Louis Brownlow, Director of the Public Administration
Cleaxing House in Chicago, drew up the memorandum and presented it

41Ibid., p. 22.
Clinton L. Rossiter, "The Constitutional Significance of
the Executive Office of the President,” The American Political
Science Review, XLIII (December 1949), 1207.
4 ^The National Resources Board was composed of Secretary
of the Interior Ickes, Secretary of War Dern, Secretary of Agri
culture Wallace, Secretary of Commerce Roper, Secretary of Labor
Perkins, Federal Emergency Relief Administrator Hopkins, and the
three members of the Advisory Committee, Frederic A. Delano, Wesley
C. Mitchell, and Charles E. Merriam.
The members of the Advisory
Committee had been brought into the government as the National
Planning Board to assist Ickes in planning the activities of the
public works projgram. Wann, pp. 204-205.
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to the President.

In their memorandum they stated that a study

could be made.
It would be possible to make a thorough study of the
whole problem as it develops in American public life--a
study directed toward the institutional arrangements,
general understandings and practices which would most
effectively aid the Executive in the double task of m an
agement plus political leadership and direction.44
They also suggested that the Public Administration Committee of
the Social Science Research Council, a private research group
headed by Brownlow, would be willing to undertake the study.

45

Discussions of the problem continued through the winter of
1935-36, and, in late February, Roosevelt asked Brownlow to pre
pare a more precise statement of what a study of reorganization in
the Executive would include.
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After a series of meetings between

Brownlow and the President, it was announced on March 22, 1936,
that a committee had been appointed ” . . . t o make a study of the
relation of the Emergency Agencies to the regular organizations
of the Executive branch of the Government.”4^

Named to the Com

mittee were Brownlow, Merriam, and Luther Gulick, Director of the
Institute of Public Administration in New York.
Roosevelt, in naming his own committee, decided against
having the Public Administration Committee of the Social Science

44Brownlow, p . 327.
45Ibid., pp. 327-328.
46Ibid., p. 334.
4^Samuel I . Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, V (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 144.
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Research Council do the study for two reasons.

First, the acti

vities of the Public Administration Committee were supported by
funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, and Roosevelt felt that
connecting the name of Rockefeller with such a study would be
frowned upon by members of Congress.

Secondly, he felt that the

magnitude of the subject matter dictated that the committee be
appointed by him and that it have official governmental status •48
At the same time that he appointed his committee, Roose
velt sent a letter to the Senate asking that Virginia Senator
Harry F. Byrd's Committee, already established to consider re
organization, cooperate with the P r e s i d e n t s Committee.

Also, he

sent a letter to the House of Representatives asking the House to
establish a similar committee to work in cooperation with the
P r e s i d e n t s Committee.
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Because 1936 was an election year, the members of the
Committee and the President agreed that it might be politically
expedient if the Committee did not meet with the President until
after the election on November.

Roosevelt did not want to risk

having pre-election political opposition build against him over
the subject of reorganization.

This was the first effort by

Roosevelt to keep the activities of the Committee secret.

Despite

his letters to Congress asking for cooperation, the activities of
the Committee and the contents of its report were kept secret up
until the report was announced.

Roosevelt wanted to keep everything

48Wann, pp. 75-76.
^^Rosenman, R o o s ev e l t s Public Papers, V, p. 144.

secret so that when the report was submitted he could not feel
bound to accept it if he disagreed with its contents .5<^
The Committee was free to work on its own until after the
election, not meeting with Roosevelt until November 14, when they
discussed tentative recommendations.

It was at this meeting that

Roosevelt, offering a bit of criticism, outlined his desire for a
group of administrative assistants in the White House to aid him
in managing and coordinating the work of the departments and
agencies.

He also criticized the lack of a plan to incorporate

the independent regulatory commissions into the regular executive
organization.

Except for these two criticisms he endorsed what

.
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the Committee had produced so far.
On Sunday, January 3, 1937, the final report was presented
to the President and approved•

On January 10, it was presented to

the Democratic leaders of Congress; the next day Roosevelt
answered questions concerning the report at a news conference; and
on January 12, he sent the report to Congress, asking for the
adoption of its major recommendations.
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The proposals of the Committee may be summarized as
follows:
1.
Expand the White House staff so that the President
may have a sufficient group of able assistants in his own
office to keep him in closer and easier touch with the
widespread affairs of administration and to make a speedier
clearance of the knowledge needed for executive decision;

50

Richaxd Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt *s Government,
The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1966), p . 14.
5^I b i d ., pp. 20-21.
5^Wann, p p a 84-85.
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2. Strengthen and develop the managerial agencies of
the Government particularly those dealing with the Budget,
efficiency research, personnel, and planning, as management
arms of the Chief Executive;
3. Extend the merit system upward, outward, and down
ward to cover all nonpolicy-determining posts; reorganize
the civil-service system as a part of management under a
single responsible Administrator, strengthening the Civil
Service Commission as a citizen Civil Service Board to
serve as the watchdog of the merit system; and increase the
salaries of key posts throughout the service so that the
Government may attract and hold in a career service men and
women of the highest ability and character;
4. Overhaul the 100 independent agencies, administra
tions, authorities, boards, and commissions, and place them
by Executive order within one or the other of the following
12 major executive departments: State, Treasury, War,
Justice, Post Office, Navy, Conservation, Agriculture,
Commerce, Labor, Social Welfare, and Public Works; and
place upon the Executive continuing responsibility for the
maintenance of effective organization;
5. Establish accountability of the Executive to the
Congress by providing a genuine independent postaudit of
all fiscal transactions by an Auditor General, and restore
to the Executive complete responsibility for accounts and
current financial transactions.53
The submission of the Committee's Report to Congress
marked the beginning of a long and bitter struggle to pass legis
lation that would enable Roosevelt to implement the suggestions
made by the Committee.

Opposition from Congress was expected and

it came almost immediately.

Senator Byrd, who had pledged the

cooperation of his Senate committee with the President's Com
mittee, supported what the President was doing until the report
was announced.

He had even asked Brownlow to serve as head of his

advisory committee, and he wanted Gulick's Institute for Public
Administration to do the research.

Byrd promised not to release

any of the findings of his own committee until after the President

53

Report of the President's Committee on Administrative
Management (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 52.

had presented his plans; Byrd, however, understood he would have
an opportunity to examine those proposals and offer his own sug
gestions*

When the report was announced, Byrd withdrew his

54
support .
Byrd decided to withdraw his support for the President’s
plan when he realized he disagreed with Roosevelt’s spending
policies.

By r d ’s approach to reorganization was that of fiscal

responsibility and he believed the aim should be a balanced
budget.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, viewed a balanced budget

as highly desirable, but a secondary priority to improved manage
ment.

Byrd had always been suspicious of Roosevelt’s loose fiscal

policy, and the proposal in the Brownlow Report to abolish the
Comptroller-General and replace the pre-audit of Executive fiscal
■transactions with a post-audit confirmed his suspicions.
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Also

contributing to B y r d ’s decision to break with the President was
the manner in which he had been treated by the President and the
Committee.

The Committee failed to confer with him like they had

promised, and the Report was announced without Byrd’s seeing it.
When he requested to see the President, he was ignored.

54
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Polenberg, pp. 31-35.

^ T h e President’s Plan would "change the existing comp
troller general into an ’auditor general’ responsible solely to
the Congress for the post-audit of federal fiscal activities; and
transfer the existing pre-audit function to the Treasury and the
quasi-Judicial function to the attorney general." Brownlow, p. 386.
^^Polenberg, pp. 31-35.
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Supporting Senator Byrd's view and other fiscal conserva
tives in the Congress were the recommendations made by the
Brookings Institution.

Brookings had been hired to do the

research work on reorganization for the Senate and the House, and
their recommendations concerning the Comptroller-General ran
counter to the proposals made by the Brownlow Committee.

The key

difference between the two reports was the view of where control
of expenditures should be.

The Brownlow Report recommended con

trol by the Executive and Brookings recommended control by Con57
gress.

"
Another source of Congressional opposition arose from

those Congressmen who were alienated by the secrecy surrounding
the Brownlow Reportc

Not one Congressman was consulted con

cerning reorganization during the period in which the Committee
was preparing its report.

The contents of the report were not

known to congressmen until being sprung upon them on January 10.
Roosevelt further alienated them by giving the impression that he
did not want any modification of the plan, which was interpreted
by the congressmen as dictatorial.
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During 1935 and 1936 there was growing resentment over
Roosevelt's manner of dealing with Congress.
become high handed and arrogant.

Some believed he had

Others resented the loss of

power that had been experienced by the Congress.

The Executive

reorganization plan and the manner in which it was presented

5^Ibid., p . 39.
58Ibid., p. 42.
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coupled with Roosevelt's ill conceived plan to reorganize the
federal courts, submitted February 5, 1937,

59

were enough for a

Congress, which had become increasingly critical of what it con
sidered a usurpation of its power, to say no.

The Congress linked

the two plans together and rebelled against what it considered the
dictatorial actions of the President,,

Also, there was an opinion

in Congress that it was the place of Congress to introduce govern
ment reorganization legislation; and if they granted the President
the right to issue reorganization orders they would be giving up
,. .
60
that p o w e r .
„ . . the leaders of the legislative branch • • . from
the beginning of the government had considered them
selves responsible for the control, confinement,
building, and ultimate determination of the organization
of all branches of the government
A joint committee was created by Congress to consider
reorganization, holding occasional hearings with the P r e s i d e n t s
Committee during the months of February, March, and April of 1937.
However, most of the time of Congress was taken up by the President1s

^ T h e conservative Supreme Court of the New Deal period had
been declaring much of Rooseveltfs actions to combat the depression
unconstitutional. Since six members of the Court were over seventy
years of age, Roosevelt, in an effort to overcome this handicap,
proposed that for every justice over seventy who refused to resign,
a co-justice be appointed to the court. If the proposal became
law, Roosevelt would be able to appoint six new justices, thus,
enlarging the Court to fifteen members and overcoming the handicap
the Supreme Court presented.
Leonard Baker, Back to B a c k , The Duel
Between F.D,R. and the Supreme Court (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1967), pp. 8-9.
^°Wann, pp. 89-90.
^Brownlow, p. 392.
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Court Bill, and little positive action was taken on reorganization.
When time came in June for a bill to be drafted, there was a dis
agreement between the Senate leaders and the House leaders as to
how the drafting should be done.

Senator Robinson, Chairman of

the Joint Committee, wanted a single bill; whereas, Congressman
John Cochran, leader of the House delegation, wanted to split the
bill into four proposals.
their own bills.
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Thus, the two groups proceeded to draft

The Senate ran out of time in its session

before reorganization was brought up, but the House of Representa
tives was able to vote on two of the four measures into which the
reorganization plan had been broken down.

The House passed both

measures by a substantial margin, but the opposition to these
measures on the floor of Congress was a portent of darker days
ahead for the Roosevelt Administration.
The first measure, providing for six presidential assis
tants, was attacked by Congressman Charles L. Gifford of Massjachus etts.
They are asking for more secretaries to write our
legislation for us; brain children who will write our
bills in such difficult language that even our own Sam
Rayburn will need have them at his side to advise h i m . ^
Representative Dewey Short of Missouri called the measure an
64
attempt at 11. . . one-man-rule government by executive decree.”

62Polenberg, pp. 46-47.
^ U . S . Congress, House of Representatives, Representative
Gifford speaking against H. R. 7730, 75th Cong., 1st sess., July
27, 1937, Congressional Record, 7683.
64u„S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative
Short speaking against H. R. 7730, 75th Cong., 1st sess., July 27,
1937, Congressional Record, 7691.
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He classified the Presidential assistants as "theoretical, intellectual, professional nincompoops.

. . ."

The second measure introduced, regrouping agencies and
creating a Department of Welfare, was attacked with the same type
of language.

Representative Mott from Oregon claimed that the

Congress and not the President should change or consolidate governmental agencies•

Representative Short attacked this measure

as vitriolically as he attacked the first.
God pity America i.n the future if we continue to
refuse responsibility that is ours, and cowardly,
. . . , turn over our constitutional prerogatives and
surrender not only our rights but also our duties to
some individual at the other end of Pennsylvania
Avenue.^7
Reorganization made no further legislative progress during
the first session of the 75th Congress before adjournment, and was
not taken up again until the Senate did so during the third ses
sion of the 75th Congress in March of 1938.

In the meantime,

opposition to reorganization began to build outside of Congress.
The rise of dictatorships in Europe made much of the public uneasy
about too much executive power.

Also, during this time there was

a setback in economic recovery and people were afraid RooseveltTs
programs were not working.

They became suspicious of his actions.

65Ibid.
^ U . S . Congress, House of Representatives, Representative
Mott speaking against H. R. 8202, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August 13,
1937, Congressional Record, 8858.
£*7

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Representative
Short speaking against H. R. 8202, 75th Cong., 1st sess., August
13, 1937, Congressional Record, 8861.
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These two factors made the Court Plan and the Reorganization Plan
unpopular•

Conservative anti-administration groups like Frank

G a n n e t t ’s National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government
tried to mobilize the public against the Reorganization Plan,
claiming that it would give the President dictatorial power.
Opposition was generated by the Civil Service advocates against
the suggestion to reorganize the Civil Service under a single
administrator.

Semi-autonomous government agencies like the Corps

of Engineers, and pressure groups like the American Legion and the
Veterans of Foreign Wars lobbied against the proposal to incor
porate the independent government agencies into the Executive
departments.

Congressmen and Senators were deluged by telegrams

and letters urging them to vote against any reorganization bill.

68

When the Reorganization Bill was introduced in the Senate
it was opposed by conservative Senators who fought the Court Plan,
claiming dictatorship.

Senator Hiram Johnson of California warned

the Senate;
Someone once said, "Democracy gives every man the
right to be his own oppressor." Whether that be so or
not, let us not be parties to oppressing ourselves or
killing democracy.69
Opposition also came from those Senators against the Civil Service
proposal and those against the proposal transferring government
regulatory agencies into the Executive departments.

^8Polenberg, pp. 148-154.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Hiram Johnson speaking
against S. 3331, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., March 17, 1938, Congres
sional Record, 3465.
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Despite this strong opposition the administration forces
led by Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina was able to push

\70
the Reorganization Bill through the Senate by a 49 to 42 vote.)
However, administration people were not so successful when the
bill was sent to the House of Representatives for approval. (^The
House voted 204 to 196 to send the measure back to committee,
constituting defeat for Roosevelt. 71
It was a combination of things that defeated the Reorgani
zation Bill.

Those who wanted to inflict a defeat on the Presi

dent, those who wanted to protect favorite bureaus and agencies,
and primarily those who resented the expanding authority of the
Executive all joined forces to defeat the bill. 72
After the defeat of the Reorganization Bill in the House
of Representatives, Roosevelt decided to let things cool off
before trying to push another reorganization bill through Congress.
In 1939 he submitted a watered down version of the earlier reorganization bill.
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Authorizing the President to suggest plans of

reorganization, the bill made the plans subject to a veto by a
majority of both Houses.
The reorganizations specified in the plan shall take
effect in accordance with the plan:
(a) Upon the expiration of sixty calendar days after
the date on which the plan is transmitted to the Congress,

7 ^Polenberg, p. 138.
7lI b i d ., pp. 165-166.
72Ibid., p. 175
73Wann, pp. 97-98.
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but only if during such sixty-day period there has not
been passed by the two Houses a concurrent resolution
stating in substance that the Congress does not favor
the reorganization plan.?4
The Bill also dropped the controversial issues of modernizing the
civil service system, renovating accounting procedures, creating
new departments of government, and bringing regulatory agencies
into the Executive departments.

75

This time the Bill had a rela

tively easy time of it and was passed by both Houses .y)
In accord with the Reorganization Act, Roosevelt submitted
five reorganization plans to Congress, Plan I being the most sig
nificant in the study of the Presidential Advisory System.

Sub

mitted April 25, 1939, and approved by Congress twenty-two days
later, (plan I asked for the power to establish the Executive
Office o f the President, and on September 8, 1939, Roosevelt
issued Executive Order 8248 establishing the Executive Office.
There shall be within the Executive Office of the
President the following principal divisions, namely;
(1) The White House Office, (2) The Bureau of the
Budget, (3) The National Resources Planning Board, (4)
The liason Office for Personnel Management, (5) The
Office of Government Reports, and (6) in the event of
a national emergency, or threat of a national emergency,
such office for emergency management as the President
shall determine.?^

^Reorganization Act, Statutes at Large, LIII, sec. 5(a),
562 (1939).
? 5Polenberg, p. 185.
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Samuel I . Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1941), p. 491.
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The White House Office, one of two original Executive
Office agencies still active today, was divided into three sub
divisions; the Secretaries to the President, the Executive Clerk,
and the administrative assistants.

T o d a y s White House Office

has grown since its establishment and has been changed somewhat by
each President, but the basic structure is the same.
^The second division of the Executive Office established by
Roosevelt's Executive Order was the Bureau of the Budget, also
still active.

It was removed from the Treasury Department and

placed at the Presidents right hand to be used by him as a part
of his personal s t a f f .

The Bureau was given numerous adminis

trative and advisory duties by Rooseveltfs Executive Order
The other divisions of the Executive Office, the National
Resources Planning Board, the Liaison Office for Personnel Ma n 
agement, and the Office of Government Reports have all disappeared
from the Executive Office.

The National Resources Planning Board

was abolished in 1943 when Congress decided to withhold funds from
the agency; however, its duties of advising the President on
economic conditions and proposing measures to improve economic
stabilization were later given to the Council of Economic Advisers
by Congress.

The Liaison Office for Personnel Management func

tioned until 1953, at which time, President Eisenhower made the
Liaison Officer a personal adviser on personnel matters and
eliminated the Liaison Office.

The Office of Government Reports,

established to handle information flowing between the Federal
Government and state and local governments, was ma^de a part of the
Office of War Information in 1942.

Later revived by President
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Truman, the Office of Government Reports was permanently ter
minated by Congress m

1947.
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Chart II-1
Rooseveltfs Advisory System
The President---

The Cabinet
le
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8,
9.

Secretary of State
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of War
Attorney General
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Agriculture
Postmaster General

Outside Advisers

The Executive Office
The White House Office
Secretaries to the
President
Executive Clerk
Administrative Assistants
Bureau of the Budget
2
3 , National Resources Planning
Board
4
Liaison Office for Personnel
Management
, . Office of Government Reports

The .establishment of the Executive Office of the President
was the end of a long and bitter struggle by Roosevelt to institu
tionalize the Presidential advisory structure.

As it turned out,

it was one of the most significant events in the history of the
Presidency.

With the advent of Wbrld War II, Roosevelt needed an

advisory structure he could call on quickly and with confidence.
Expansion of the Executive and increased involvement of the United
States in foreign affairs after the war made an institutionalized
advisory system a necessity for succeeding Presidents.

Today, it

is hard to imagine how the Executive would operate without i t ,

77Wann, pp, 178-179,
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The Executive Office has given the Presidency a place in which
new advisory agencies can be placed when a need for them arises,
and, ironically gives the Congress an institution upon which it
can focus its attention when its members feel that the power of
the President has to be limited.

New agencies placed in the

Executive Office can be controlled by Congress, whereas, in the
system that existed before the establishment of the Executive
Office there was no means of control.

Maybe if the members of

Congress had realized this in 1938, they would not have fought so
hard „

CHAPTER III

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Established by Roosevelt as part of the Executive Office
of the President for the purpose of easing his administrative bur
dens, the White House Office has become the most prestigious
agency in the Executive Office of the President.

It is the center

of activities in the Executive Branch and takes precedence over the
other units in the Executive Office.'*'

It has grown to include

approximately 300 people, with the President utilizing 12 to 15
special assistants who are specialists in such diverse fields as
foreign affairs, defense, welfare and education, urban problems
o
and agriculture.

Members of the White House Office

. . . help prepare his Cfche President fs3 messages,
speeches, and correspondence; arrange his appointments;
oversee the inflow and outflow of his communications,
analyze and refine the problems confronting him; advance
his purposes with legislators, departments, private
groups, and party officialdom.^
It was George Washington who set the precedent of appointing
a Secretary to the President when he appointed his nephew Lawrence

-I-Edward H. Hobbs, Behind the President, A Study of Execu
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954),
p. 86.
^James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch, An
Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 22.
^Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1968), p. 159.
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Lewis to be his secretary.

This position was filled by the Presi

d e n t s relatives at the President’s personal expense until 1857
when Congress began paying the Secretary a meager salary.

During

McKinley’s Presidency, Congress dignified the position by legally
recognizing it and raising the salary.^
When Herbert Hoover became President, the Secretary to the
President headed a small staff of secretaries and clerks often
borrowed from other departments.

Hoover changed the custom and

appointed three secretaries.^

Therefore, when Roosevelt became
A
.
President in 1933, in addition to a clerical staff and a private
secretary, he had legal authority for three Secretaries to the
President.
A dominant figure in the Roosevelt White House establish
ment until illness caused her retirement in 1943, was his private
secretary Marguerite (Missy) LeHand.

First meeting Roosevelt when

she went to work for his campaign manager during the 1920 campaign
for the Vice Presidency, she subsequently went to work for him when
he became Vice President of the Fidelity and Depository Company,
accompanying him to the Governor’s Mansion in Albany, New York, and
to the White House.

6

She wielded immense influence in the White

House, as can be seen by this description written by Stanley High,
a Roosevelt speech writer:

4Hobbs, p. 86.
5Louis Brownlow, The President and the Presidency (Chicago:
Public Administration Service, 1949), p. 104.
^Robert A. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 205-206.
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Missy is the one indispensible member of the secre
tarial entourage.
She not only understands what the
President is driving a t — and approves of it--she under
stands the President.
No one else breaks in on him with
so little hesitation or knows so well when breaking in
would not be judicious. Her disapproval of a person or
a course of action is more difficult to overcome than that
o f anyone else, save only Mrs. Roosevelt.^
An example of Missy*s influence was given by Edward J.
Flynn, Roosevelt*s political adviser.

When Roosevelt’s first

choice for Attorney General, Senator Thomas J. Walsh, died sud
denly, Missy suggested appointing Homer S. Cummings to be Attorney
General.

Roosevelt did not accept the idea at first; however, the

more he thought about it the more he liked it, and Cummings was
appointed temporary Attorney General.

Cummings did such a fine

job that Roosevelt decided to keep him on as permanent Attorney
General
One of the three Secretaries to the President appointed by
Roosevelt in 1933 was his Press Secretary, Stephen T. Early.

Early,

an experienced newspaperman and a close friend of Roosevelt’s
since the Democratic Convention of 1912, was skillful in handling
g
the President’s frequently strained relations with the press.
He
would not take the job until he was assured that Roosevelt would
cooperate in a liberalized press policy.

Therefore, one of the

first things Roosevelt did was to open up the Presidential Press

^7

Stanley High, Roosevelt-And Then? (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1937), pp. 32-33.
^Edward J. Flynn, Y o u ’re The Boss (New York: The Viking
Press, 1947), pp. 125-126.
Q

Sherwood, p. 207.
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Conference.

His conferences were not staged as were the press

conferences of his predecessor.

They were held more frequently,

and the press was given greater access into the functioning of

10
the government.
Another of the three Secretaries appointed by Roosevelt
was Appointments Secretary Marvin McIntyre.

McIntyre, also a

former newspaperman, became acquainted with Roosevelt when the
latter was Assistant Secretary of the Navy and McIntyre was Chief
of the Press Offices of the Navy Department.

He was Roosevelt’s

Press Officer during the 1932 campaign, traveling all over the
country with the candidate.

As Appointments Secretary, McIntyre

was particularly effective in screening those who wanted to see
the President and in acting as a contact man between the White
H o u s e and Capitol Hill
High:

His value was described by Stanley

’’The only people who get around him belong to that inside

and unofficial family who know both Missy LeHand and the President
well enough to make the approach through her.”

McIntyre remained

Roosevelt’s Appointments Secretary until illness forced him to give
it up during Roosevelt’s second term.

He continued to work for

Roosevelt until his death in 1943.
The third Secretary appointed by Roosevelt after he took
office was Louis McHenry Howe.

Acting as Roosevelt’s chief of

•^Patrick Anderson, The President’s Men (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1968), p. 59.
Sherwood, p. 208.
12High, p. 30.

staff he was given the title Secretary, while Early and McIntyre
were given the title Assistant Secretary.

Howe and Roosevelt met

in 1911 when Howe, a newspaperman, was covering the New York State
Legislature.

Roosevelt was a first term state senator leading an

insurgency of young Senators against the party bosses; and Howe,
an experienced political reporter, offered advice to the group.
Through this association, Roosevelt got to know Howe very well;
and in 1912 when Roosevelt ran for a second term in the New York
Legislature, he asked Howe to conduct his campaign.

After Roose-

velt's election to a second term, he and Howe became permanent
political associates.

13

Roosevelt was the public figure in the partnership, the
candidate and the office holder, handling public contact and the
questions of public policy.

Howe was the behind-the-scenes figure

in the partnership, the man behind the candidate who ” . . .

con

centrated on the secret maneuver, the manipulation of the press,
the organization of personal loyalties and patronage hunger."

14

Roosevelt depended upon Howe’s abilities as a shrewd political
15
analyst and an inescapable critic.
As Rooseveltfs assistant, Howe accompanied him to the
Department of the Navy when Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of
the Navy under Woodrow Wilson, through the campaign for Vice

■^Alfred Brooks Rollins, Roosevelt and Howe (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 61.
14Ibid.
l5Ibid.
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President in 1920, to the Governor’s Mansion when Roosevelt
became Governor of New York in 1928, and finally to the White
House when Roosevelt was elected President.
Howe met precisely the hard core of qualifications
which Roosevelt demanded in his closest collaborators .
H e was loyal almost to a fault. He could never be a
rival. He was willing to pattern his life around the
needs of his boss. He would be trusted never to be a
yes man at home, but he would seldom be indiscreet and
never be treacherous a b r o a d /1 f\
0
Howe was more than an adviser to Roosevelt, he was a mem
ber of the family, and when Roosevelt became President, Howe
moved into the White House along with the rest of Roosevelt’s
family, occupying the Lincoln Room.

An able assistant to Roose

velt for years, it was in the White House that H o w e ’s value to
Roosevelt began to wane.

Roosevelt’s need for advice and assis

tance increased when he became Governor of New York, and increased
even more when he became President..

Howe was primarily a polit

ical manipulator, and Roosevelt needed intellectual talents that
Howe lacked.
advisers.

Howe discovered that he had to compete with policy

In Albany, Howe had to compete with Roosevelt’s special

counsel Samuel Rosenman, and during the Presidential campaign he
had to compete with Roosevelt’s campaign policy advisers.

17

Howe

was extremely jealous of their relationships with Roosevelt, and

16T, . .
Ib i d .
17

Anderson, p. 13.
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this jealousy sometimes caused unneeded tensions.

18

. .
His limited

intellectual talents, his petty j’ealousies, and his deteriorating
health (he suffered from acute asthma) diminished his usefulness;
however,

Roosevelt still felt close to him and continued to con

sult with him until he died in 1936.
Roosevelt's three Secretaries were part of what became
known as the "Cuff Links Gang."

When Roosevelt ran for Vice

President in 1920 he gave the men who worked for him a pair of
cuff links with "FDR" engraved on one side of the cuff links and
the recipient's initials on the other.

In later years only a few

others were able to gain membership into this group.

19

They

included Maj'or General Edwin M. (Pa) Watson, Roosevelt's military
aide, who later took over McIntyre's j'ob as Secretary in charge
of appointments.

Watson was *'. . . adept at letting the right

people see his chief and mollifying the disappointed;

. . ."

20

18

An example of Howe's j*ealousy can b e seen in an incident
that occurred at the 1932 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Roose
velt was nominated to run for President and several of his campaign
policy advisers collaborated to write his acceptance speech.
When
Roosevelt arrived from New York to accept the nomination, Howe
insisted that Roosevelt discard the speech written by the policy
advisers and deliver one that he, Howe, had written. Roosevelt
accommodated. Howe by reading the first page of Howe's speech and
the rest of his original speech. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
l^Members of the Cuff Links Gang were Howe, Early, Marvin
McIntyre, Charles H. McCarthy, Thomas Lynch, Kirke L. Simpson,
Stanley Prenosil, James P. Sullivan, Samuel I. Rosenman, Henry
Morgenthau, Basil O'Connor, Henry Hooker, Harry Hopkins, Edwin M.
Watson, Ross Mclntire, and Robert E. Sherwood. Sherwood, p. 941.
20

James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), p. 9.
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It was a deep personal loss for Roosevelt when Watson died of
acute congestive heart failure and a cerebral hemorrhage in 1945
on the way home from the Yalta Conference.

21

Roosevelt depended upon his small administrative staff for
personal assistance rather than political.

They were ", • • not

particularly influential on matters of public policy."

22

However}

they would give the President unbiased judgements and sometimes
blunt criticism, advising on people rather than on policy.

Roose

velt expected his aides to be totally dedicated to him and to pro£
tect him from criticism.

If he suspected an effort on the part of

one of his aides to build a power base for himself, Roosevelt would
ease him out.

Those who submerged their fortunes in Roosevelt's,

for example, Marvin McIntyre, Stephen Early, and Missy LeHand,
were protected by the President.

Those who became political lia-

bilities were discarded. 23
Early in his administration, Roosevelt, in an effort to
increase the assistance he needed in an expanding Executive,
devised a method of using subordinates in Executive departments
and agencies for White House assignments.

Officially employed by

an executive department, many of these subordinates worked full
time as aides to the President.

At times, Roosevelt would bring

people into his service from outside of the Federal Government,

21Ibide, p. 579.
22Anderson, p. 54.
23Ibid.

giving each a job in one of the Executive agencies with the
understanding that the employee's first obligation was to the
President.

For example, Raymond Moley, the head of Roosevelt's

group of policy advisers during the 1932 Presidential Campaign was
given the job of Assistant Secretary of State with the intent that
he was to be number one policy adviser and troubleshooter for the
President.

The workload for this State Department position was

light and Moley would spend some of his State Department time
working on issues important to the President,

24

The method of drawing White House aides from Executive
departments and agencies served a twofold purpose.

Roosevelt's

most conspicuous administrative failing was that he could not
bear firing anybody.

25

By using employees of Executive agencies

he was not only able to increase the administrative assistance he
needed, but he was able to phase out those he no longer needed
much easier than firing them.
aide for any more assistance.

He would simply not call on the
The aide would continue to work at

his government department or agency until he realized that he was
no longer wanted and would resign.

Often the President would drop

a hint by sending the aide on a lengthy insignificant assignment
outside of Washington.

In this manner the embarrassment of an

aide being driven from the White House was avoided.

26

^ R a y m o n d Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1939), pp. 115-116.
^ A r t h u r m . Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. II
The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1959), p.
540.
^ L o u i s W. Koenig, The Invisible Presidency (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 33-34.
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As President, Franklin Roosevelt personally coordinated
the Executive Branch by himself, keeping his hand in almost every
important aspect of administration and making most of the important decisions himself.

27

His assistants were his leg men, his

personal liaisons working behind the scenes and reporting back to
him.

They helped him coordinate.

However, the reliance upon

coordinative assistance did not mean that Roosevelt delegated any
decision making authority to others.
. . . in RooseveltTs staffing there was no place for
a Sherman Adams. Roosevelt made and shifted the
assignments; he was the recipient of staff work; he
presided at informal morning staff meetings; he
audited the service he was getting; he coordinated
A fs report with B Ts. . . ,28
Roosevelt’s methods of administration were oftentimes
confusing to his aides.
administration.

He took the competitive approach to

Assignments were distinct from each other, but

bore a close relationship to each other.

Aides could not do

their jobs without watching, checking, and j'ostling one another.

29

This approach brought Roosevelt ” . . . a n effective flow of infor
mation; it made for administrative flexibility and stimulated sub30
ordinates to effective performance.”

Roosevelt was basically a

A. J. Wann, The President As Chief Administrator, A
Study of Ftanklin D. Roosevelt (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1968), p. 32.
28Richard E. Neustadt, ’’Approaches to Staffing the Presi
dency,” The American Political Science Review, LVII (December 1963),
858.
29Ibid., p. 857.
30
J Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, p. 537.
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lone operator and worked best through his individual assistants,
singling out one assistant as his number one administrative
assistant, his "troubleshooter.’’
Roosevelt’s first troubleshooter was Louis Howe, who
enjoyed his greatest influence before Roosevelt became President.
Howe is significant because he is the one who set the pattern for
those troubleshooters who followed.

The duties he performed

unselfishly for Roosevelt were the duties subsequent trouble
shooters were expected to perform, and with the same type of
loyalty and devotion.

Few of them equalled H o w e ’s dedication.

31

After the 1932 election, Roosevelt relied heavily upon
Raymond Moley for troubleshooting duties.

Moley was recommended

to Roosevelt by Sam Rosenman to help organize Roosevelt’s campaign policy advisers,

32

and after the election Moley ’’. . .

33
suddenly found himself the ’packhorse’ of the Roosevelt train.’’
Moley was given the job of giving some direction to the army of
idea men invading Washington.

34

with potential Cabinet members,
Roosevelt.

He was used as an intermediary
and as chief speech writer for

It was Moley’s job ” . . . t o sift proposals for him,

discuss facts and ideas with him, and help him crystallize his own

33-Anderson, p. 20.
82Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 57-58.
33Rollins, p. 367.
34Ibid., p . 368.
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policy."

35

Moley became Roosevelt’s liaison with Congress and

government agencies involved in new legislative proposals.

He

. brought together Wallace, Tugwell, Mbrgenthau, and M. L.
Wilson to draft a farm program.

He set Berle and others to work

on mortgage relief and transportation.

He assigned Samuel Unter-

myer and Charles Taussig to work on securities legislation."

36

Differences developed between Moley and Roosevelt during
the first term which undermined M o ley’s influence in the adminis
tration.

At the London Economic Conference of 193 3, where 66

countries met tx> discuss worldwide economic problems, Moley was
embarrassed by Roosevelt when the President repudiated an agree
ment Moley had made at the conference.

Also, Moley had been sent

to the Conference when the American delegation, headed by the
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, seemed to be in disarray, thus
causing hard feelings with Hull.

Hull complained to Roosevelt

that Moley tried to undercut his authority at the Conference and
make him look bad in the eyes of the President.

When IVfoley

returned to the United States, Roosevelt did nothing to try and
placate him.

Shortly after this incident Moley resigned to turn

his efforts toward establishing the Today magazine.

He continued

to help write some of Roosevelt’s speeches through 1934 and 1935,
but gradually faded from Roosevelt’s circle of advisers.

35Moley, p. 55.
3^Rollins, p. 368.
37Moley, pp. 238-277.

37
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Moley was replaced for a while by another policy adviser,
Rexford Tugwell, but starting in 1934 two young government lawyers,
Tommy Corcoran and Ben Cohen, were used increasingly by the Presi
dent.

Corcoran was recommended to Roosevelt by Roosevelt’s friend

Felix Frankfurter.

Frankfurter was worried about the increasing

burdens of the Presidency and Roosevelt’s attempts to shoulder
them all himself.

He suggested that Roosevelt needed a young,

intelligent, energetic man to act as troubleshooter, and he recommended Corcoran.

38

Corcoran was teamed with Cohen who was ”. • „ ,

the academic type, a calm, quiet and unemotional scholar, a modest
39
philosopher.’’

Tommy Corcoran and Ben Cohen were Roosevelt’s

chief troubleshooters from 1936 until 1940.

’’Corcoran was premier

odd jobber around the White House--leg man, troubleshooter, and
40
expediter, all rolled into one.”

Cohen was more of a behind-

the-scenes worker, drafting laws and giving legal advice.
As helpful as Roosevelt’s troubleshooters were they were
still only officials of the President’s household.

They were not

officers in any chain of administrative command, and they did not
have the legal authority to act for the President.
authority still converged in the White House.

S^Grace Tully, F.D ,R. My Boss
Sons, 1949), p. 141.

The lines of

41

(New York: Charles Scribner’s

39Ibid., p. 142.
40

Beverly Smith, ’’Corcoran and
zine, August, 1937, p. 125.
^Sherwood, p. 209.

Cohen,” The American Maga
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. . . Roosevelt used these special assistants in an
unofficial, informal, irregular, and sometimes hap
hazard manner to aid him in maintaining contacts with
his subordinate administrators, to find out for him
specific information he wanted about administrative
activities, and to help him work out agreements and
better relationships among the representatives of the
various agencies 0 He seems to have regarded them as a
sort of extension of himself; they were to do some of
42
the things which he did not have time to do for himself*
When Roosevelt began his campaign to reorganize the Execu
tive he made it clear to the reorganization committee that he
wanted additional administrative assistants provided for in its
report*

The final report called for six assistants.

In 1939,

when the Executive Office of the President was established, the
six administrative assistants were incorporated into the White
House Office,

Roosevelt’s troubleshooters, prototypes of the six

administrative assistants, were legally recognized.
Their function would be, when any matter was presented
to ihe President for action affecting any part of the
administrative work of the Government, to assist him in
obtaining quickly and without delay all pertinent infor
mation possessed by any of the executive departments so as
to guide him in making his responsible decisions; and then
when decisions have been made, to assist him in seeing to
it that every administrative department and agency affected
is promptly informed,4 ^
The power to establish the six administrative assistants
was given to Roosevelt when Congress passed the Reorganization Act
of 1939 and subsequently approved his first reorganization plan
asking permission to establish the Executive Office of the Presi
dent,

Roosevelt took advantage of this grant of power when he

42Wann, pp. 39-40.
42Report of the Committee on Administrative Management,
p• 5*
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issued Executive Order N d e 8248 on September 8, 1939, establish
ing the Executive Office and including within it the White House
Office,

The White House Office consisted of the three Secretaries

to the President which were made a part of the White House Staff
in Hoover's administration; the Executive Clerk, instituted to
organize and supervise all clerical services and procedures in the
White House Office; and, the six administrative assistants.

44

Since the establishment of the White House Office, new
positions have been created.

In 1941, two new positions, Special

Assistant to the President and Special Executive Assistant, were
created,

and, in 1944, Roosevelt added the office of Special

Counsel to the President, appointing Judge Samuel Rosenman to the
post.

45

Through the years the composition of the White House

Office has fluctuated; however, the size has gradually increased.
Today, there are many assistants working in the White House,
variously referred to as Administrative Assistants, Special
Assistants, Deputy Assistants, Deputy Counsels, or Counsels, and
they all exist to help the President accomplish his administrative
duties.

Since its establishment by Roosevelt it has become the

nerve center of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.

44Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (London; Macmillan and Co., Limited,
1941), p. 491.
45Hobbs, p. 87.

CHAPTER IV

THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

The Bureau of the Budget was established with enactment of
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1'921 •

Established as part of the

Treasury Department, it was intended to be a staff agency to help
the President carry out his responsibilities for effective public
management

Among those management responsibilities was the

preparation of the executive budget.
Up until 1921 financial requests were prepared and sub
mitted separately by the departments and branches of the Federal
Government.

The Treasury Department assembled them and presented

them to Congress for approval.

2

The budget idea did not catch on

in the Federal Government until costs reached two billion dollars
and there was an outcry from the people against excessive government expenditures .
William H. Taft was the first President to push for a
regular executive budget, establishing in 1911 the Commission on
Economy and Efficiency to investigate five administrative areas,

i

Percival Flack Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. v i i .
2Ibid., p. 3.
3

Edward H. Hobbs, Behind The President, A Study of Execu
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954),
p. 22.
54
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the first of which was the budget as an annual financial program.
The Committeefs report,

"The Need for a National Budget," was

transmitted to the Congress, and, despite its recommendations on
the need for an annual budget and how it should be prepared, the
report was ignored.

4

In 1913, Taft submitted a budget to Congress

for consideration and in the message accompanying the budget
recommended ". . . a central accounting, auditing, and reporting
organization which would include among its activities the prepara
tion of a budget

. . . ."^

With the involvement of the United States in the First
World War the national debt rose, and in 1919, it was $25.5 bil
lion.

The method of each agency separately submitting fiscal

requests unrelated to each other or to the total of all amounts
recommended to Congress through the Treasury Department was inadequate.

A resolution, therefore, was introduced in the House of

Representatives to appoint a select committee to study the matter
and report to the House.

7

At the same time, a committee was also

formed in the Senate to study the subject.

In 1920, a bill was

passed in the Senate, and another one in the House of Representatives.

4 Ibid„, pp. 23-24.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Message of the President Sub
mitting a Budget, S. Doc. 1113, 62d Cong., 3d sess., 1913.
^Brundage,: p. 10.
^U.S., Congress, House, A Resolution Establishing a
Special Committee on a Budget System, H. Res. 168, 66th Cong.,
1st sess., Jul. 31, 1919, Congressional Record, LVTII, 3431.
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The Senate bill called for an enlarged office of the Secretary of
the Treasury with an internal bureau responsible for the prepara
tion of the budget, and the House bill provided for the creation
of a budget bureau directly under the President.

A compromise

bill was passed, sent back by President Wilson because of a tech
nicality, and was eventually signed by President Harding on June
10, 1921*

The compromise provided for a director of the budget

and his assistant, appointed by the President, working under his
orders, but located m

the Treasury Department.

9

The 1920*s were years of stabilization for the Bureau of
the Budget.

However, a significant development occurred during

Harding1s administration that became a part of the regular pro
cedure of the Bureau of the Budget.

With the establishment of

the Bureau, "federal agencies were no longer able to decide for
themselves what appropriations they could ask for from Congress.
Procedures were established whereby all agency proposals for
legislation involving public funds had to be submitted to the
Bureau.

Budget Director Chairles G. Dawes issued Budget Circular

49 on December 19, 1921, outlining the procedure.

Requests or

recommendations were to be sent by the executive department or

^Senator Medill McCormack of Illinois explained the dif
ferences in the two bills on the floor of the Senate. U.S.,
Congress, Senate, 66th Cong., 2d sess., April 30, 1920, Congres
sional Record, LIX, 6266-6271.
^Brundage, p. 12.
l^Ibid., p. 106*
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agency to the Director of the Budget who in turn would make recom
mendations to the President.

The head of the executive department

or agency concerned was to ascertain, through the Director of the
Budget, if the request or recommendation was in accord with the
financial program of the President

After approval by the

President, agency proposals were then sent to Congress with the
Bureau's statement of advice.

12

During Harding's administration these legislative clear
ance procedures were not strictly enforced, but when Coolidge
became President they were strongly enforced, with a tendency
towards fiscal conservation.

President Hoover also enforced the

procedures, emphasizing the relationship of central clearance to
budgetary control.

13

When Franklin Roosevelt became President there was a lack
of concern about, and understanding of, the procedures of central
clearance.

The new administration was so busy it was not able to

enforce the procedures.

It was not until early 1934 that the

Budget Bureau made efforts to persuade departments to comply with
the procedures, but it was a year later that Roosevelt took an
active role in establishing compliance with clearance procedures.
At that time Roosevelt introduced the first of three innovations

11 Ibid., quoting Budget Circular 49, issued December 19,
1921.
■^Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: The
Growth of Central Clearance,” American Political Science Review,
XLVIII (September 1954), 644.
l3Ibid., pp. 644-647.
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leading to expanded jurisdiction of legislative clearance by the
Bureau of the Budget.

In an effort to stop the practice of un

coordinated agency requests for legislation, he introduced policy
clearance.'*'4'
Executive departments and agencies had been seeking the
passage of favorable legislation in the Congress without Roose
v e l t s knowledge.

Therefore, clearance was made a requirement of

all agency proposals for policy legislation, and Roosevelt
designated the National Emergency Council as the clearing agency.
Appropriations measures were still to be cleared through the
Budget Bureau.

By 1936, the National Emergency Council had

become a little used agency in the Executive, and in 1937, the
P r e s idents Committee on Administrative Management recommended
‘
that the Budget Bureau take over the clearance duties of the
National Emergency Council.
During recent years the Bureau of the Budget has
functioned as an agency for the President in the clear
ance of the fiscal aspects of legislative measures pro
posed by the executive departments. This clearance is
of value to the Congress and to the departments and is
essential to the exercise of the authority and responsi
bility of the President. It should be applied to all
legislation proposed by the executive departments and
agencies and should not be limited to fiscal considera
tions . The Bureau o f the Budget could well take over
the present duties of the National Emergency Council in
this r e s p e c t . ^

14Ibid., pp. 647-649.
15

Report of the President1s Committee on Administrative
Management (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 20.
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The demise of the National Emergency Council resulted in the
transfer in 1937 to the Bureau of the Council Ts authority to clear
non-fiscal legislation.

16

During the period in which the Bureau was being estab
lished as clearance agency for policy legislation, Roosevelt insti
tuted two more clearance procedures.

In 1936, Roosevelt gave the

Bureau the duty of assisting the President in the consideration,
clearance, and preparation of executive orders and proclamations. 17
Also, Roosevelt established the Bureau as the circulating and
correlating agency for all enrolled bills sent to the White House
by Congress.

Before the 1930*s, when an enrolled bill from Con

gress reached the White House it would be circulated by the Presi
dent’s Secretary or Executive Clerk among the agencies concerned
with the bill.

The bill would be passed by hand, with agency

recommendations and criticisms filtering back to the White House
for the White House Staff to correlate.

All this had to be done

within the ten days the President had to veto the bill.

The Presi

d e n t ’s time for consideration of agency replies before making up
his mind was short because of the lack of expediency within the
system.

By 1938, Roosevelt had the Bureau of the Budget handling

18
almost all enrolled b i l l s .

"^Neustadt, ’’Central Clearance,” p. 652.
17

Brundage, p. 23.

^®Neustadt, ’’Central Clearance,” pp. 654-655.
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The Bureau improved the system of circulating and corre
lating by having facsimile copies o f each enrolled bill prepared
by the Public Printer for the Congress sent to the Bureau at the
same time the original was sent back to Congress for the Speaker’s
and Vice President’s signature.

These copies were distributed to

the agencies involved in the bill before the bill officially
reached the White House, thus, giving the Bureau a head start on
the ten days the President had to veto.

Later, the stipulation

was added requiring agency replies, accompanied by recommendations,
be submitted within 48 hours after receipt.

A recommendation

against the bill was to have a draft veto message or memorandum of
disapproval attached.

Responsibility for overseeing these activ-

ities was vested in the Bure a u ’s Division o f Coordination.

19

The Division of Coordination was formed into a separate
division in 1938.

After the passage of the Reorganization Act of

1939, it became the Division of Legislative Reference, and in 1952
its name was changed to Office of Legislative Reference.

During

World War II, the Office of War Mobilization handled some of the
clearance functions, but when James Webb became Budget Director in
1946 full responsibility shifted back to the Bureau.

20

Today, the

Office of Legislative Reference is the number one
«, o • clearing agency for legislation to be drafted and
submitted, for analyses of bills that have already been
introduced in Congress, for obtaining departmental views
on those bills, for determining the relationship of

19Ibid., p. 655.
^Brundage, p. 108.
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legislation to the program of the President; and for
coordinating the departmental viewpoints to be expressed
in testimony.
In addition to recommending that the Bureau of the Budget
take over the responsibilities of the National Emergency Council
for clearing policy legislation, The Report of the President’s
Committee on Administrative Management was responsible for further
changes involving the Bureau.

The Committee recommended that the

Director of the Bureau be relieved of routine duties so that he
could devote himself to problems of fiscal policy and planning.
It also recommended that the preparation of the budget be super
vised by the Bureau of the Budget, that the administration research
function of the Bureau be adequately developed to aid the Presi
dent, that the information function of the Bureau be developed
and improved, and that the Bureau should serve in various ways as
22
an agency of the President.

To accomplish the recommendations made by the President’s
Committee, when Roosevelt established the Executive Office of the
President, he included the Bureau of the Budget within it.

Roose

velt believed that it was necessary to transfer the Bureau out of
the Treasury Department and into the Executive Office because it
would facilitate the Bureau’s coordinating activities and its

2lIbid., p. 111.
on

The Report of The President’s Committee on Administra 
tive Management, p. 20.
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research and investigational activities.

The Bureau was given

the following duties to perform as a member of the Executive
Office of the President:
a. To assist the President in the preparation of the
Budget and the formulation of the fiscal program of the
Government.
b.
To supervise and control the administration of the
Budget.
c. To conduct research in the development of improved
plans of administrative management, and to advise the
executive departments and agencies of the Government with
respect to improved administrative organization and practice.
d. To aid the President to bring about more efficient
and economical conduct of Government service.
e. To assist the President by clearing and coordinating
departmental advice on proposed legislation and by making
recommendations as to Presidential action in legislative
enactments, in accordance with past practice.
f. To assist in the consideration and clearance and,
where necessary, in the preparation of proposed Executive
orders and proclamations, . . .
g. To plan and promote the improvement, development,
and coordination of Federal and other statistical services.
h. To keep the President informed of the progress of
activities by agencies of the Government with respect to
work proposed, work actually initiated, and work completed,
together with the relative timing of work among the several
agencies of the Government; . . ,24
In 1939, Roosevelt appointed Harold D. Smith Director of
the Bureau of the Budget.

Smithfs concept of the Bureau1s main

function made him the right man to implement the changes made by
Roosevelt.

Smith believed that the main function of the Bureau

was 11. „ . t o serve as an agent of the President in coordinating

23Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses Of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited,
1941), p. 250.
24Ibid., p. 492.
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operations and in improving the administrative management of the
25
government»”

The Bureau’s functions were expanded beyond trying

to insure the balancing of the budget, to a point where it became
an important management and advisory tool to be used by the Presi
dent.

A. J. Wann considers it to be the backbone of the Executive

Office of the President.

Edward H. Hobbs also calls it the

backbone of the Executive Office and declares it to be the most
27
highly organized of all the Executive Office agencies.
Roosevelt made the Bureau of the Budget a strong adminis
trative arm of the Presidency.

By making it responsible for super

vising legislation proposed by Executive departments, and advising
on legislation passed by Congress and sent to the President for
approval, Roosevelt gave the Bureau the responsibility of
coordinating the President’s legislative program.

Roosevelt’s

transferring of the Bureau out of the Treasury Department into the
Executive Office made it the President’s agency, eliminating the
handicap of sharing authority with the Secretary of the Treasury.
The increased emphasis on advisory and management functions,
initiated by Roosevelt, is reflected in the changing of the
Bureau’s name in 1970 by President Nixon to the Office of Manage
ment and Budget.

J. Wann, The President As Chief Administrator, A
Study of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Washington, D .C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1968), pp. 179-181.

^Hobbs, p. 21.

CHAPTER V

THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

The planning for a peacetime economy, undertaken by Co n 
gress after World War II, resulted in the passage of the Full
Employment Act of 1946 and the establishment of the Council of
Economic Advisers.

Composed of three members appointed by the
y
President, the Council is located in the Executive Office of the

President, and due to the training and experience of each member,
. . . is exceptionally qualified to analyze and inter
pret developments, to appraise programs and activities
of the Government . . . , and to formulate and recommend
national economic policy to promote employment, production,
and purchasing power under free competitive enterprise.*^*
It is given the responsibility of keeping

. . the President

fully informed of economic developments and emerging problems which
2
may affect the Nation’s economy.”
The Council has several important responsibilities in
addition to keeping the President informed.

It participates in

varieties of more formal committees, task forces, and studies; and
it represents the United States in a number of important inter
national conferences.

The Council is also given the responsibility

Full Employment A c t , Statutes at Large, LX, sec. 4(a),
24 (1946), U.S. Code, Vol. Ill, sec. 1023(a) (1970).
^Economic Report of the President (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 201.
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to explain and clarify the Administration’s economic policies
through speeches, articles, press briefings, statements, congres
sional testimony, an annual report, and assistance in the preparation of the President’s Economic Report.

3

The efforts by Congress to establish post-war economic
planning was an implicit recognition of the guidance and direction
Franklin Roosevelt and his circle of economic advisers gave to
domestic economic policy.

4

On the other hand, these efforts by

Congress to establish economic planning and create a Council of
Economic Advisers were also a reaction to the practice of economic
policy being determined by inner circles and invisible advisers,
Roosevelt’s Brains Trust for example, without any Congressional
controls.5
Mud

legislation passed during Roosevelt’s

first one hundred days in office was a product of the thinking of
a group of inen gathered together to act as Roosevelt’s economic
policy advisers before the Presidential election of 1932.

This

group, composed mainly of college professors, was dubbed the

3Ibid., p. 202.
^Lester G. Seligman, ffPresidential Leadership: The Inner
Circle and Institutionalization,” The Journal of Politics, XVIII
(August 1956), 418.
5Ibid., p. 419.
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’’Brains Trust” by a New York Times reporter.^
The Brains Trust came into existence shortly after Roose
velt announced his candidacy for President of the United States in
January, 1932.

There are conflicting claims by Samuel Rosenman

and Raymond Moley as to who originated the idea of the Brains Trust.
Rosenman claims he first suggested the idea to Roosevelt one eve
ning in March, 1932, and Roosevelt liked it so well he gave
7
approval to go ahead with i t „

Moley claims that Roosevelt had

spoken to him about the idea that winter and it, therefore, had
Q
already been in the air before March.
While Roosevelt was Governor of New York he had frequently
9
consulted with college professors on legislative policy;
so,
regardless of from whence the idea of using college professors as
advisers came, Roosevelt was receptive to it.

It was felt that

college professors could supply the country with some fresh new
economic ideas.

In his March conversation with Roosevelt, Rosen

man succinctly expressed the reasons for choosing college profes
sors as advisers:

^Louis Howe referred to the group derisively as "your
brains trust” in a conversation with Roosevelt, and Roosevelt used
it in a news conference shortly afterward. One of the reporters at
the news conference used it in his news article the next day and
the title stuck. Samuel I, Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 81.
7Ibid., pp. 56-57.
o

Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1939), pp. 8-9.
^William E. Leuchtenburg, F.D.R. and The New D e a l , 19321940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 32.
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Usually in a situation like this, . . • , a can
didate gathers around him a group composed of some
successful industrialists, some big financiers, and
some national political leaders. I think we ought to
steer clear of all those. They all seem to have failed
to produce anything constructive to solve the mess
w e ’re in today.10
Raymond Moley was asked to recommend those he thought
would aid Roosevelt in mapping out his economic strategy for the
Presidential campaign.

A list was drawn up by Moley and the p er

sons were interviewed one by one by Roosevelt, Moley, Rosenman,
and Doc O ' C o n n o r / ^ with the recommendation accepted or rejected
by Roosevelt.

By this method two men were chosen to become mem

bers of the Brains Trust, Rexford G. Tugwell and Adolf A.Berle,

JT r

.

12

The final composition of the Brains Trust consisted of
Moley, an authority on public law who emerged as the leader of the
group; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., an expert in corporation law who was
recruited because of the work he was involved in on the nature and
the control of corporations;

13

and Rexford G. Tugwell, the first

man recommended to Roosevelt by Moley, and an authority on agri
cultural economics.
according to Moley,

An agricultural economist was chosen because,
,Tthe obvious beginning of our discontents in

10Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 57.
11
D. Basil (Doc) O fConnor was Roosevelt’s former law part
ner and an adviser of Roosevelt’s while Roosevelt was Governor of
New York*
12Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 58-59.
"^Moley, p. 18.
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this country was the persistence of the delusion that the nation
could prosper while its farmers went begging,"

14

Sam Rosenman

and Doc O ’Connor, as established advisers to Roosevelt, also
became members of the group.

Charles William Taussig, President

and Chairman of the Board of the American Molasses Company and
Hugh S. Johnson, protege of financier Bernard M. Baruch and even
tual administrator of the National Recovery Administration, worked
in close association with the group, as did Key Pittman, Senator
from Nevada.
From the time of its inception to the day Roosevelt took
office as President of the United States, the purpose of the
Brains Trust was to help find specific remedies to apply to Roose
v e l t ’s general objectives of economic recovery.

As a group, they

mapped, out economic strategy with Roosevelt for hours at a time
with the discussion many times lasting until very late at night.
As individuals, members of the Brains Trust would make studies in
their particular fields of expertise and present them to Roosev e l t .15
As economic policy advisers, the Brains Trust advanced the
economic philosophy of cooperation amongst government, business,
labor, and agriculture, and the abandonment of laissez faire.
They believed that in a modern industrial society problems of
price-wage-profit behavior and the allocation of resources could

14lb i d ., pp. 14-15.
^^Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, pp. 63-65.
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b e handled only by integration of private and public planning.
Their efforts were aimed at devising institutional means of
associating business, labor, agriculture, and government in this
process.16
The speeches written by the Brains Trust during the cam
paign contained the germs of what was to come when Roosevelt became
President.

In the "Forgotten Man" speech made on the radio in

Albany, New York, April 7, 1932, Roosevelt placed emphasis on the
man at the bottom of the economic ladder.

Written by Moley, the

speech contained the seeds of several of Roosevelt’s future
17
national recovery projects.

Hinting at the need for a planned

economy, Roosevelt discussed restoration of purchasing power to
the farming half of the country, the prevention of foreclosures of
home and farm mortgages, assistance to small banks as well as
large, and the reduction of tariff barriers.

18

Subsequent cam

paign speeches concentrated on the themes of economic planning and
cooperation, and social responsibility.

At a Jefferson Day Dinner

later in April of 1932, he attacked the laxity in regulating pub
lic utilities and blamed dwindling American foreign trade on high
tariffs instituted by the Republicans.

19

At Oglethorpe University

in May he referred to the securities industry as

•^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol.
Ill: The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1960),
p. 389.
^Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt, p. 61.
l8Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, I (New York: Russell and Russell, 1938), p.
626.
19Ibid.s pp. 627-639.

. . • that small group of men whose chief outlook upon
the social welfare is tinctured by the fact that they
can make huge profits from the lending of money and the
marketing of securities--an outlook which deserves the
adjective "selfish" and "opportunist".20
In later speeches, he discussed tariff barriers; concentration of
economic power; needed supervision of security sales and exchanges,
bank deposits, and holding companies; separation of investment
banking from commercial banking; farm relief; public utilities;
public works; public health and welfare; long range planning for
unemployment; and the interdependence of business interests with
j
.
those of agriculture and labor.
When Roosevelt took office in 1933 the Brains Trust ceased
to exist as a formal group.

However, several members took jobs in

the federal government and stayed on as advisers to Roosevelt,
helping him institute the New Deal for America he had pledged in
his nomination acceptance speech.

Moley became Assistant Secretary

of State and remained the President’s chief speech writer and
assistant, while Tugwell took the job of Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture and Hugh Johnson became the administrator of the
National Recovery Administration.
The National Recovery Administration was established
shortly after Roosevelt became President to accomplish the goal of
industrial planning.

It was to administer the provisions of the

National Industrial Recovery Act.

According to the act, trade or

industrial associations, or other groups representing an industry,
were to apply to the Administration for approval of codes of fair

20Ibid., p. 642.
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competition.

Section 7a provided for collective bargaining, maxi

mum hours, and minimum wages; title II provided for a Public Works
Administration.

The purpose of the National Industrial Recovery

Act was
. . . to remove obstructions to the free flow of inter
state and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the
amount thereof; and to provide for and maintain united
action of labor and management under adequate govern
mental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate unfair
competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible
utilization of the present productive capacity of
industries, to avoid undue restriction of production
(except as may be temporarily required), to increase
purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment,
to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to reha
bilitate industry and to conserve natural resources
The Act was the result of pressure from diverse sources
striving to solve the problems of industrial recovery.

Pressures

came from business advocating protection of prices and profits,
from trade unions advocating the protection of labor standards,
from those who considered the existing competitive system competing
at the expense.of human decency.

22

The Agricultural Adjustment Administration was instituted
to administer the provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
which was passed in an effort to restore the purchasing power of
farmers for industrial products by lowering the disparity between
prices of agricultural and other commodities.

As a part of the

pi

The National Industrial Recovery A c t , XLVIII, sec. 1,
195 (1933).
^ A r t h u r M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, Vol.
The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co.,
1959), p. 94.
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act, provision was made for the farmer to receive a subsidy for
limiting output, thereby, reducing surpluses and raising prices.

23

Through the activities of the National Recovery Administra
tion business activity showed marked gains, and the Agricultural
Adjustment. Administration helped halt the fall in farm prices.

24

The concept of national economic coordination helped mobilize the
nation's industry; however, problems of enforcing the National
Recovery Administration codes existed.

In the effort to estab

lish economic cooperation Roosevelt discovered that many corpora
tion executives
. . . openly flouted or skirted around all provisions of
the NRA which were not entirely favorable to them,
assailed most of the other New Deal measures, and spent
millions of dollars trying to convince the country that
Roosevelt was an egomaniacal Communist
Roosevelt's cooperative program stopped the downward spiral,
but it did not accomplish enough toward recovery.
had not been taken care of.

The little man

National income was up, cash income

for farmers was up, unemployment had declined, but the figures
nowhere matched those of the pre-depression years.

Of\

Five million

were still unemployed and on the relief roles .27

^ J o h n Major, e d ., The New Deal (New York: Barnes and
Noble, Inc., 1967), p. 60.
^^Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 362.
^ S c h l e s i n g e r , The Politics of Upheaval, pp. 1-3.
^ B a s i l Rauch, The History of the New Deal 1933-1938 (New
York: Creative Age Press, Inc., 1944), p. 158.
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In January of 1935 Roosevelt announced that the new goal
of recovery was going to be social justice.

Recovery would be

brought about by putting purchasing power into the hands of the
least privileged groups and the policy of supporting economic
policies of the business world was to be abandoned.

The reason

for this change of policy was the fact that although the economy
had made some progress toward recovery, Roosevelt’s previous program had not reached the average American. 28

The attitude of big

business, the failure of his program to reach the little man, the
actions of the Supreme Court in declaring Roosevelt’s recovery
actions unconstitutional, and pressure from anti-big-business
interests pushed Roosevelt toward the left. 29
Roosevelt’s change in philosophy was marked by a slow
turnover in advisers„

In 1935 the Brains Trusters were replaced

as policy advisers by a group of young lawyers who were proteges
of Felix Frankfurter and influenced by the philosophy of Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who ” . . .

believed not only in

close government regulation of the corporation but in breaking up
their monopolies and restoring competitive conditions in favor of
30
the small businessman.”

Eventually this group of lawyers in the

school of Brandeis was j'oined by a group of economists in the

28Ibid., pp. 156-159.
29 Goldman, Rendezvous, p. 362.
^Major,

p. 79.
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school of Keynes,

31

John Maynard Keynes, English economist,

believed that declining private expenditures could be compensated
for by increasing government expenditures.

Keynes theorized that

national income was the sum of consumption and investment, and,
if people stop consuming and investing, national income will fall*
The only way to increase national income,.according to Keynes, was
by increasing either consumption expenditures or investment
expenditures or both, and if private enterprise could not accora. 32
plish this task there were governmental means of doing it.
The influence of men like Moley, Tugwell, Berle, and
Johnson, members of the First New Deal declined.
replaced by figures of the Second New Deal,

They were

Frankfurter, Corcoran,

Cohen, James M. Landis, Leon Henderson, Marriner S. Eccles,
William 0. Douglas, and Laughlin Currie.

33

The "soak the rich"

tax in 1935, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and the Fair
Labor Standards Act are all attributable to this new group of
advisers.

34

The shift was from a managed to a mixed economy.

The

First New Dealers tried to convert business through new institu
tions, whereas, the Second New Dealers tried to discipline it
35
through new laws.

31

"The First New Deal characteristically told

Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, p* 387.

qp

Stephen Kemp Bad.ley, Congress Makes a L a w , The Story
Behind The Employment Act of 1946 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1950), p. 17.
33

Schlesinger, Upheaval, p. 387.

^4Seligman, p. 414.
^^Schlesinger, Upheaval, p. 392.
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business what it must do.

The Second New Deal characteristically

36
told business what it must not do . ”
The expression ’’Brains Trust” stayed on to be applied to
those new policy advisers, and throughout his years in office
those advisers closest to Roosevelt were referred to as members
of his Brains Trust.

The expression

. • • came to have kind of generic connotation. In the
New York Times index . c . as many references to the term
can be found in 1936 as in 1933. But by that time, or
even earlier, it had been expanded to include not only
all university people in Washington but all those who
might b e called intellectuals#3 '
Roosevelt’s move away from national economic coordination
and toward an anti-monopoly philosophy is illustrated in a message
Roosevelt delivered to Congress April 29, 1938.

In the message

he attacked big business and proposed a program to control it.
Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise
and is becoming a cluster of private collectivisms;
masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the
American model, it is in fact becoming a concealed
cartel system after the European model.38
He told Congress that there was no plan to abandon the anti-trust
laws as a means of controlling business, and, in order to streng
then them, he was going to ask for an additional $200,000 in the
budget for the Department of Justice to use in anti-trust investi39
gations.

36ibid.
37pexford G. Tugwell, The Brains Trust (New York: The
Viking Press, 1968), p* xxx*
38Franklin Roosevelt, ’’Stop Collectivism in Business” in
New Deal Thought, edited by Howard Zinn (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1966), p. 125.
39Ibid., pp. 128-129.
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Rooseveltfs administration marked the advance of the role
of the economist in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government
from tactical to strategic0

There was an increase in use of pro

fessionally trained economists as advisers at the policy-making
level rather than as technicians at the operative level, and in
1939 when Roosevelt established the Executive Office of the Presi
dent and institutionalized his advisory system, he included several
40
economists in his group of Assistants «,

According to Edwin G.

Nourse, the first Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
this staffing, along with the advice that came to the President
from the economists on the National Resources Planning Board, set
the pattern of economic advisership in the Executive Office of the
President in 1945 when the Full Employment Act was first pro
posed
The National Resources Planning Board, an agency included
in the original Executive Office, grew out of the National Plan
ning Board of the Public Works Administration created by Roosevelt
in 1934.

In 1939 it became the central long-range economic plan-

ning agency for the Executive Branch.

42

Roosevelt defined the

BoardTs duties as follows:

Edwin G. Nourse, Economics in the Public Service, Admin
istrative Aspects of the Employment Act (New York: Haircourt,
Brace and Co., 1953), pp. 89-91.
^ B a i l e y , pp. 25-26.
42I b i d .
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a. To survey, collect data on, and analyze problems
pertaining to national resources, both natural and human,
and to recommend to the President and the Congress long
time plans and programs for the wise use and fullest
development of such resources,
b. To consult with Federal, regional, state, local,
and private agencies in developing orderly programs of
public works and to list for the President and the C o n 
gress all proposed public works in the order of their
relative importance with respect to 1 . the greatest food
to the greatest number of people, 2 . the emergency
necessities of the Nation, and 3* the social, economic,
and cultural advancement of the people of the United
States•
c« To inform the President of the general trend of
economic conditions and to recommend measures leading to
their improvement of stabilization,
do To act as a clearing house and means of coordina
tion for planning activities, linking together various
levels and fields of planning ,43
The National Resources Planning Board was terminated in
1943 when Congress cut off appropriations, but, before its
demise, the Board submitted a report to Roosevelt outlining an
economic bill of rights and suggesting postwar economic policy.
This report was transmitted to Congress, and, according to
Stephen Bailey, represents better than any single document of the
war years the progressive postwar thinking in the Federal Govern
ment, and was an impetus to those forces which combined to make
possible the introduction of the Full Employment Bill in 1945,

44

Roosevelt was responsible for placing the responsibility
for planning the nation’s economy directly in the hands of the

Samuel I • Rosenman, The Pub1ic Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, VIII (London: Macmillan and Go,, Limited,
1941), p. 493.
^Ba i l e y , pp. 26-27.
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Executive.

Thus, the passage of the Full Employment Act of 1946

confirmed his economic leadership and institutionalized his
initiatives.

The Act made the President responsible for the

nation’s economy.

At the same time, Congress took steps to

limit, restrict, and contain the President’s power.

45

Congress

established the Council of Economic Advisers to perform the
functions performed by Roosevelt ’s circle of advisers and the
National Resources Planning Board, but the Council was made
responsible to both the President and the Congress.

In the Act,

Congress defined the type of personnel to be placed on the
Council, required that they be confirmed by the Senate, made it
a statutory body funded by Congress, required that the President’s
Economic Report be submitted to a Joint Committee of Congress to
46
h e studied and approved.
The decision to establish a statutory body of economists
to advise the President was made after testimony had been given
before the House of Representative’s Committee on Expenditures in
the Executive Branch.

Economist George Terborgh, in his influ

ential testimony, called for a small independent commission,
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

45

47

In an

Seligman, p. 419.

4 6 Ibid.s pp. 418-419.
4 7 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments, Full Employment Act of 1945, Hearings,
House of Representatives, on H. R. 2202, 79th Cong., 1st sess.,
1945, p. 613.
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obvious reference to Roosevelt*s advisers, Terbprgh stated the
following:
. . « both the economic analysis and the economic policy
may be prepared and promoted by men unknown to the p u b 
lic, whose appointment has not been confirmed by Congress,
and who have no formal public responsibility.
This set
up invites behind-the-scenes manipulation by Presidential
advisers of the moment, possessed, it may be, both by a
passion for anonymity and a passion for controlling
national economic policy. However able and highminded
these advisers may be, the arrangement is bad. 8
Henry Wallace,

Roosevelt*s Vice President, also recommended a

council of professional economists, pointing out that a council
of this kind might have been helpful during the recession of
49
1937 .
President Roosevelt and his economic policy advisers,
therefore, had a double influence upon the establishment of the
Council of Economic Advisers.

By institutionalizing Presidential

leadership in the area of economic policy, Congress recognized
Roosevelt’s personal leadership in formulating and implementing
economic policy; however, Congress also recognized that some of
the economic advice received by Roosevelt was given to him by
people who were trained in economics but who were not necessarily
experts in the field, and who were unrestricted in their advisory
powers.

The establishment of the Council of Economic Advisers was

an effort to facilitate Presidential leadership and at the same
time control Presidential power.

4 8 Ibid., p. 612.
4 9 I b i d ., p. 849.

^Seligman, p. 420.
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CHAPTER VI

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Although efforts to form some type of permanent consulta
tive body dealing with national security and war preparedness date
back to before World War I,
the 1940*s.

2

1

the concept was not accepted until

With the advent of World War II and the subsequent

abandonment of isolationism, the neeci for a security policy
making body to coordinate military and political activities was
realized.

This need was satisfied when, as part of the National

Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council was estab
lished •
Since its beginning the National Security Council has
become an important part of the Presidential Advisory System,
moving into the Executive Office of the President in 1949.

3

Mem

bership of the Council includes the President, Vice President,

•*-Paul Yo Hammond, "The National Security Council as a
Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and
Appraisal," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960),
p. 899.
2

Ernest R. May, "The Development of Political-Military C o n 
sultation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, LXX
(June, 1955), p. 162.
q
See the message to the Congress transmitting Reorganization
Plan 4 of 1949. U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1945-), Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. 316-17.
80
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Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of the Office
of Emergency Planning, and others the President might appoint.
Meetings are also attended by the Director of the Office of Ma n 
agement and Budget, Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

4

According to the National Security Act, the purpose of

the Council is
. . . to advise the President, with respect to the inte
gration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security so as to enable the
military services and the other departments and agencies
of the Government to cooperate more effectively in
matters involving the national security.5
Ihe National Security Council has experienced a varying
degree of influence during its relatively short history.

As it is

with any advisory unit within the Executive Office, success depends
a great deal upon the use a President makes of it.

During Presi

dent Truman’s administration the Council went through a period of
establishing itself as a working part of the Executive Office.
Truman had a strong concern for the authority, responsibility, and
prerogatives of the President and, therefore, treated the Council
casually, emphasizing its strictly advisory role by not attending
meetings regularly.

He believed that the Council was to work out

recommendations, but not make decisions or policy.

^James W. Davis, Jr., The National Executive Branch, An
Introduction (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 26.
-*The National Security Act, Statutes at Large, L X I , sec.
101 (a), 495 (1947), U.S. Co d e , Vol. XI, sec. 402 (a) (1970).
^Falk, Stanley L., ’’The National Security Council Under
Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,’’ Political Science Quarterly,
LXXIX (September 1964), pp. 405-7.
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President Eisenhower preferred to institutionalize Presi. . .
.
7
dential relationships in the Executive.

Under Eisenhower the

Council became the central vehicle for formulating and promul
gating policy, and Truman’s loose structure became an elaborate

g
system.
g
month#

Eisenhower met with the Council two or three times a
Order was brought to the Council’s activities; however,

it was criticized for being overstaffed, excessively rigid, and
unable to deal with major aspects of national security policy
When John Kennedy became President in 1961 he did away
iwith the elaborate system Eisenhower had established, preferring
to deal with a single, small, strongly organized personal staff.
The working staff of the Council was emphasized and the Council
11
itself deemphasized.
The superdepartment that existed under
Eisenhower became just another source of advice along with the
other advisory bodies of the Executive. 12

Kennedy preferred to

work similarly to Truman, with problems brought to him for deci
sion, as opposed to Eisenhower’s system of having decisions

^Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive (Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1968), p. 167.
®Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, ed s ., The President
and the Management of National Security, A Report by the Institute
for Defense Analyses (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 60.
^Koenig, p. 169.
10 Falk, p. 424.

1:LClark and Legere, p. 70.
12F alk, pp. 429-430.
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brought to him for approval.

13

President Johnson combined the two

methods of personal influence and institutionalization when working
with the National Security Council.

He adopted the Roosevelt method

of assigning the same tasks to more than one person, but he also

f

gave new recognition to his departmental Secretaries in the field
of national security.

Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of

Defense McNamara were very influential.

14

Franklin Roosevelt’s influence on the establishment of a
permanent national security council is not as pronounced as his
influence on the establishment of Executive Office agencies pre
viously discussed; however, Roosevelt was an early advocate for
the establishment of some kind of consultative body of this type,
and his efforts in this direction helped point out the need for
such a body.

His interest in the establishment of a council began

when he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow Wilson.
Before the start of World War I, he was one of the first to urge
President Wilson to create a Council of National Defense to

coor

dinate the war preparedness effort, a suggestion Wilson delayed
acting upon.

In 1916, Wilson finally asked for and was granted

authorization by Congress to establish a Council of National Defense,
15
headed by the Secretary of War .

^K o e n i g , p. 172.
14 Ibid., p. 176.

■^A.J. Wann, The President As Chief Admi ni str at o r , A Study
of Franklin D . Roosevelt (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1968), p. 13.
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During World War I, there was increased collaboration
between the State Department and the military concerning national
security matters, but once the war was over these efforts ceased,
as did the functions of the Council of National Defense»

In an

effort to establish a permanent council, Roosevelt submitted a pro
posal for a consultative organization comprised of members of the
War, Navy, and State Departments,

On May 1, 1919, a letter was

written to the Secretary of State suggesting that the Navy, War,
and State Departments should form a Joint Plan Making Body,

16

Accompanying the letter was an elaborate diagram that ", , .
outlined duties for a State Department planning agency, for the
Army General Staff, for a Naval General Staff, and for a Joint
Plan Making Body, composed of officers from all three staffs,"

17

3>he Joint Body was to estimate national resources of both the

United States and foreign countries, and define American objec
tives for each possible war and determine the force needed for
success.

Roosevelt’s proposal never reached the Secretary of

State, being sent by mistake to the State Department’s Division of
Latin American Affairs where it was filed away until transferred
to the general records.
A second proposal was submitted to the Secretary of State
two years later.

This time the proposal was made by the Army and

l-^Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Ordeal
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), pp. 19-20.
■^May, p, 168.
18
Ibid.
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the Navy, and called for State Department representation on the
Joint Board of the Army and Navy.

The Secretary of State, Charles

Evans Hughes, dismissed the idea claiming that the only State
Department officials qualified to take part, the Secretary and the
Undersecretary, were too busy.

Consequently, the military and the

State Department went separate ways.

19

The military and the State Department did not get together
formally to discuss national security until Roosevelt became Presi
dent.

His Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, began sending State

Department officials to military conferences and including the
military in some of the State Department activities.

Alarmed by a

possible war in Europe he proposed the formation of an interdepart
mental committee to consider national security policy.

The result

was the establishment of the Standing Liaison Committee, composed
of the Undersecretary of State, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Army Chief of Staff.

The Standing Liaison Committee became the

first regular council on national security policy incorporating the
military and the State Department.

Existing until 1943, the Stand

ing Liaison Committee was not extremely effective, rarely deciding
on issues of policy.

However, it did give the military and the

State Department an opportunity to work together and gain insights
into each otherrs official activities.

19

20

Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National
Security (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 30.
20May, p. 172.
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At the approach of World War II, an ad hoc Cabinet committee
was organized by Roosevelt consisting of the Secretaries of War,
Navy, and State.

This informal war council had no secretariat,

agenda, or machinery for lower level coordination.

21

It met on

the call of the President, and met very frequently before the start
of World War II.

22

Despite its resemblance to the present National

Security Council, Roosevelt did not give the War Council an oppor
tunity to formulate policy on its own, running it in the same
manner as he ran other special councils he formed, as a platform
to announce decisions already made and to outline his own ideas on
the subject of security policy.

When war broke out, Roosevelt

dropped Secretary Hull and the State Department out of the War
Council and dealt with his chiefs of staff and his personal
advisers.
gotten.

23

Coordination of strategy and policy was temporarily forAccording to Henry Stimson, RooseveltTs Secretary of

War, establishing a war council as an effective security policy
making body was prevented by Rooseveltfs desire to make policy
decisions himself.

The lack of authority to act on its own under-

mined the effectiveness of any war council formed.

24

^Stanley, p. 9.
22 U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1946, p. 2066.
23 May, p. 173.

24

Henry L. Stimson and MeGeorge Bundy, On Active Service
In Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 562-564.

87
In 1940, as the result of an exchange of letters between
the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, another war council
was formed.

Regular, unofficial and personal meetings were held,

serving the purpose of keeping one another informed on major
problems concerning politico-military matters.

25

In 1944, this

Committee of three was reorganized with the establishment uf a
recorder, a formal agenda, and the reaching of conclusions.

An

interdepartmental body was formed at the assistant secretary level
composed of representatives from the State, War, and Navy Depart26
m ents.

An example of the Committee^ activity is its participa

tion in the drafting of the occupation directives for Germany,
Austria, and Japan.

27

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), as this
new body was called, operated through subcommittees composed of
departmental representatives which were coordinated by a secre
tariat.

Policy proposals were cleaxed by the secretariat before

they were sent to the Assistant Secretaries.

Any disagreement with

decisions made by the Committee was referred to the President.

28

The Committee became the State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Coor
dinating Committee (SANACC) when the Air Force gained departmental

23Harold W. Mosely, Chairles W. McCarthy, and Alvin F.
Richardson, ’’The St ate-War-Navy Coordinating Committee,” The Depart
ment of St at e Bulletin, XIII (November 11, 1945), p. 745.
2^Stimson and Bundy, p. 563.
27

Mosely, McCarthy, and Richardson, p. 746.

28I b i d ., pp. 746-747.
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status in 1947, and existed alongside the National Security Council until abolished in 1949.

29

A further step toward the eventual establishment of a
National Security Council was taken by President Truman on January
22, 1946, when he named the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to
a National Intelligence Authority for the purpose of planning,
developing, and coordinating all federal foreign intelligence
activities.

He also established a central intelligence group,

headed by a Director of Central Intelligence to assist the National
Intelligence Authority.

In 1947, the National Intelligence

Authority was replaced by the National Security Council.

30

Towards the end of the War, efforts began to bring about
the unification of the Armed Forces.

Several proposals were

advanced concerning the relationship of the services, the most
significant in relation to politico-military coordination being
the Eberstadt Report.

The Eberstadt Report was a report by Fer

dinand Eberstadt prepared for Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
and presented to the Senate Committee on the Armed Services.

In

the report Eberstadt made suggestions that were Incorporated into
the National Security Act of 1947.

31

He suggested the following:

^ E d w a r d H. Hobbs, Behind the President, A Study of Execu
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954),
p. 127.
30Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and
Hope (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 56-58.
31

Hobbs, p. 128.
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A National Security Council • . • established to
link up military and foreign policy. It would be composed
of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Air, the
chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and the
joint chiefs of staff. The President would be the chair
man, and in his absence the Vice President or the Secretary
of State.
The council would have a permanent secretariat.
It would have policy-forming and advisory functions and
would, among other things, advise on the combined military
budget. The Central Intelligence Agency would be a part of
it .32
Franklin Roosevelt’s influence upon the establishment of
the National Security Council was both positive and negative.

He

recognized even before the start of World War I that there was a
need for a body designed to coordinate national security policy.
His efforts and the efforts of members of his administration to
form such a body set precedents for political and military cooper
ation in determining national security policy.

However, the

organizations formed were hindered by Roosevelt’s unwillingness to
delegate authority.

The committees formed during Roosevelt’s

administration and immediately after
. . . suffered for lack of a definite mission, statutory
foundation, permanent staff, and, most of all, authori
tative direction. The lessons learned through their
experiments were all applied to the establishment of the
National Security C o u n c i l .
Of the Presidents who succeeded Roosevelt as chief execu
tive, Kennedy and Johnson came closest to handling the National
Security Council in the manner Roosevelt handled his national

^ U . S . , Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
National Defense Establishment, Hearings, Senate, on S, 758, 80th
Cong., 1st sess,, 1947, p. 8 .
^ S i d n e y W. Souers, Address to the Joint Civilian Orienta
tion Conference on June 14, 1949, quoted in Hobbs, p. 127.

security advisory.

They liked to make the final decision on

security matters, and relied on a small, more personal, staff to
advise them on national security matters.

The big difference

between Roosevelt’s attempts at establishing some type of national
security advisory and the use made of the National Security Council
by Kennedy and Johnson is that the National Security Council has a
statutory foundation.

Also, it was permanently established as part

of the Executive by President Eisenhower.

Presidents may make

extensive use, or only casual use of the Council, but it has become
a permanent part of the Executive Office of the President.

Thanks

to precedents set by Roosevelt, and the work accomplished by his
successors, the Council is there for Presidents to use according
to their administrative styles.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Franklin Roosevelt’s influence on the admi nistrativR
organization of the national government is considerable.

Under

Roosevelt, both the range of activities of the national government
and the size of its administrative organization were expanded.

It

was Roosevelt who, by his actions and by the creation of the Execu
tive Office of the President, established the President as the
chief administrator of the entire executive organization.
Before 1939, the President’s ’’Inner Circle” and personnel
borrowed from executive agencies primarily acted as Roosevelt’s
administrative staff, handling legislative matters, propaganda,
election campaigns, and other administrative duties.

2

The estab

lishment of the Executive Office institutionalized this make-shift
administrative staff.

He created the Executive Office to provide

a means for keeping the President informed on important matters,
to assist him in planning future programs, to protect him from
wasting his time and energies on subordinate affairs, to get
priority matters to his desk promptly, and to see that directives

"^A. J. Wann, The President As Chi ef Administrator, A Study
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1968), pp. 169-176.
o
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 266.
91

92
3
are carried out by subordinates c
The Executive Office of the President has become such an
important part of the Executive Branch it would be impossible for
the Presidency to operate without it today.

Roosevelt needed it

to help him administer a national government that had expanded to
where it was impossible for one man to control.

Today, the Presi

dent has to administer a national government that has expanded far
beyond what Roosevelt had to contend with.
The composition of the Executive Office has changed since
Roosevelt established it, with some agencies being added and some
eliminated.

The White House Office and the Bureau of the Budget,

now called the Office of Management and Budget, are the only two
agencies from the 1939 Executive Office still functioning, but more
than twice as many agencies presently exist in the Executive Office
than existed there in 1939, an indication of the growth of the
Federal Government.
A unique quality of the Presidential Advisory System form
alized by Roosevelt, has been its flexibility.
tion did not mean rigidity.

Institutionaliza

Presidents have been able to adapt it

to their own personal style of administration.

For example,

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson relied on the less formal aspects
of the system for advice, usually meeting to work out problems with
a small personal staff made up of members of the various advisory

^Edward H. Hobbs, Behind The President, A Study of Execu
tive Office Agencies (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1954),
pp. 6-7.
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agencies, relying on the more formal aspects of the system only
when necessary.

In contrast, President EisenhowerS method of

administering his office was to rely primarily on the more formal
aspects of the system, with routine meetings of committees and
councils.

t
t
As it has been since the beginning of the Presidency,

force of personality has made some advisers favorites, and these
advisers have influenced the thinking of the President and the
direction of the Administration, Henry Kissinger being a case in
point.

Also, since its creation, there has been a tendency for

Presidents to favor certain executive agencies over others,
depending on what kind of personality he possesses and where his
interests lie.

Both the White House Office and the Bureau of the

Budget have enjoyed a favored position and have experienced a
steady growth in size and influence since 1939.
The White House Office has expanded in size and influence
to rival the Cabinet.

This expansion of size and influence may

have reached its zenith with the revelation of its involvement in
the Watergate Affair.

The White House Office is now being sub

jected to a great deal of criticism.

James L. Sundquist, a senior

fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of Dynamics of the
Party System, in calling for the establishment of a parliamentary
type of system, decried the lack of control of the White House
Office.
Replacing the cabinet as the p r e s i d e n t s consulta
tive group has been a presidential-level staff, which
has no outside power bases and hence no independence,
and which is not subj'ect to Senate confirmation. This

staff now formulates policy for the president, issues
orders on his behalf and supervises and coordinates
their execution
Another post-Watergate critic, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
calls for the reduction in size and power of the White House staff
and a restoration of the executive departments.

"The President

will always need a small and alert, personal staff to serve as his
eyes and ears and one lobe of his brain, but he must avoid a vast
and possessive staff ambitious to make all the decisions of govern
raent.
The Senate Watergate Committee, commissioned by the Senate
to investigate illegal campaign practices in the 1972 Presidential
Election and to make recommendations which would prevent such
practices in the future, has recommended in a preliminary report
that a n u m b e r of top White House posts be subject to Senate con
firmation, particularly that of Chief of the Domestic Council.
Other preliminary proposals made by the Committee call for pro
hibiting assistants to the President from being interposed
between the President and heads of departments in the exercise of
their statutory or delegated functions, and limiting the top White
House staff to as few as 15 aides with no more than 50 supporting
professional employees.

This last recommendation gives one an

^James L. Sundquist, ’’How to Limit The Power of The Presi
dency,” The Denver Post, November 11, 1973, p. 37.
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency
(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 408.
^Clay F. Richards, ’’Plan to Cut Presidential Power Expected,
The Denver Post, April 26, 1974, p. 8 .
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idea of how the White House Office has grown since its estab
lishment when Roosevelt had to fight to get six administrative
as sistant s .
Clark Clifford and Benjamin Cohen, both former members of
the Presidential "Inner Circle," have also criticized the growing
size and power of the White House advisers.

Clifford has expressed

the opinion that this growth is a dangerous trend resulting in the
breakdown in the morale of personnel throughout the executive
branch.

7

Cohen recommends that a small inner or super Cabinet be

formed to share with the President his gravest responsibilities»
These surrogates, as Cohen calls them, would be persons of high
and independent public standing and would have to be confirmed by
the Senate.

8

The size and influence of the White House Office, combined
with President NixonTs tendency to isolate the Oval Office from
the routine business of his staff, has resulted in the White House
Office getting out of control.

It is a prime example of how a

P residents personality can affect the Executive Branch.
The Bureau of the Budget has also had a steady expansion
of its size and influence since its inclusion in the original
Executive Office.

It has bee one the Presidents administrative

right arm and has been given an increasing number of management
responsibilities.

"The Bureau in many areas, e.g., establishing

7

Hughes, Emmet John, The Living Presidency (New York:
Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, Inc., 1973), p. 318.
8Ibid ., p. 323.
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budget ceilings for the departments and clearing proposed legis
lation and enrolled bills with interested parties has become an
g
extension of the President’s ego.”

However, despite its

increased influence the Bureau of the Budget has been able to
stay clear of extreme controversy.

This could be due to the fact

that the people in the bureau are professionals, and for the most
part are non-partisan.
In contrast to the previously discussed members of the
Executive Office, the Council of Economic Advisers and the National
Security Council have had ups and downs in their influence.

They

have had to compete with the members of the President’s White
House Staff for the President’s ear.

Some Presidents have placed

more emphasis on their advice than have others.

For example,

President Eisenhower made extensive use of the Security Council,
whereas, President Kennedy practically ignored the Council.
President Nixon seems to be making greater use of the Council of
Economic Advisers than previous Presidents.

It may be that Presi

dents feel more comfortable dealing with their personal staffs than
dealing with a formal council.

The important thing is that the

expert advice of these two agencies is available when needed.
Roosevelt supplied the framework for the Presidential
Advisory System.

He gave himself and his successors the tools to

help cope with expanding government.

A serious problem faced by

Presidents today may be the expansion of the advisory system

^Hobbs, p. 40.
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itself.

The Executive Office now has fourteen agencies included

in it with hundreds of people working in many of those agencies.
It may be necessary, as exemplified by the White House Office, to
limit that expansion to prevent bureaucracy from hampering the work
of the Executive.

Problems of administration faced by Presidents

in the future may be similar to those faced by Roosevelt.
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